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This study examines the capabilities of self-determination movements in Somalia 
after the collapse of a central state to explain the variable capacities of groups to 
provide stable orders and understand why leaders of these movements choose 
particular strategies.  The primary factors shaping these strategies and capabilities 
include (1) the nature and longevity of prewar local elite relations with the central 
authority of the collapsing state, (2) the social organization of prewar and wartime 
informal economies in localities, (3) the capacity of local authorities to control, and in 
some cases, resist efforts of outsiders to mediate conflict, and (4) the capacity of local 
authorities to regulate commercial transactions with the rest of the world.  This study 
shows that some movements of  self-determination in post state collapse environments 
like Somalia are capable of creating stable polities, but that this accomplishment rests 
on using social control over wealth and commerce to keep resources to discipline 
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The Somalis have no indigenous centralized government… The key to Somali 
politics lies in kinship.  Political status is thus maintained by feud and war, and self-
help—the resort of groups to the test of superior military power—is the ultimate 
arbiter in political relations. 
    I.M. Lewis
1 
   
The fact of the situation in Somaliland is that they have elected a government in the 
most democratic way possible, within the constraints of public finance; they have 
started the process of demobilization and disarmament; they have restructured 
customs services in the port of Berbera and introduced an audit system.  None of this 
effort could be attributed to a single United Nations initiative. 
 




Somalia was once considered one of Africa’s few real nation-states, based 
upon a shared Somali language and single ethnic culture.  The five points of the star 
on its flag were meant as a call to ‘lost’ Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti left 
out in 1960 when Independence led to the union of British Somaliland and the UN 
trust territory under Italian administration, a cause for which Siyyad Barre’s regime 
(1969-91) attacked Ethiopia in 1977-78.  Yet in 1991 Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, 
hosted forty distinct, mostly clan-based armed groups.
3  Shortly before, the dying 
regime killed 50,000 fellow Somalis in a failed attempt to repress rebellion in the 
north.
4  As of 2002, the closest thing to a central government in Mogadishu was a 
precarious administration that controlled a small area of the city, a result of protracted 
negotiations in neighboring Djibouti. 
  In Hargeisa in old Somalia’s north out came a new flag and slogans to 
celebrate Somaliland’s declaration of independence on 18 May 1991.  Heads of clans 
transformed themselves into a national assembly.  Even though no other government 
extended it formal recognition, its leaders issued currency, kept order with a new 
police force, and collected revenues to provide citizens with basic public services.  In 
1999 the president of Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, upbraided Mogadishu 
politicians and warlords for their servility to clan interests and seemingly endless 
fighting.  This was the same man who had been a Somali government official, then 
head of his own clan militia.  Neighbouring Puntland created a central administration 
by 1998, but one more a development organization than a formal government.  
Puntland authorities pioneer a new hybrid organization that contracts out to private 
organizations, including indigenous ones, essential tasks such as security that are 
conventionally assigned to states. 
Leaders in Somaliland and Puntland contend with international laws and 
norms that hinder the creation of new polities.  The United Nation’s 1960 Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) 
declared that self-determination was legitimate only within the context of ex-colonial 
boundaries, and that historical or new communities outside this framework did not 
qualify as authentic candidates.  Resolution 1514 declared that ‘any attempt aimed at 
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3 Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 21. 
4 Africa Watch, Somalia, a Government at War with Its Own People, (New York: Africa Watch, 1990), 
218. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS100   Page 3 
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country 
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ 
a sentiment reinforced in consistent Organization of African Unity condemnations of 
separatist movements over the last four decades.
5  Thus no state recognizes 
Somaliland or Puntland sovereignty.  Furthermore, many scholars cite internal factors 
such as foreign aid, clandestine rackets, and diaspora remittances that prevent groups 
from repeating the Western experience of state formation.  This gives few incentives 
to strongmen to bother to negotiate with local people to construct the bonds of 
reciprocity and control over power that characterized state building in earlier times in 
Europe.
6  Yet this is what Somaliland and Puntland leaders appear to have done, even 
as their southern colleagues conformed to expectations. 
  What explains these radically different responses of similar societies to state 
marginality and state collapse?  Why do they create (or fail to create) such different 
new polities and identities amidst greater global economic integration that diasporas 
and clandestine trades bring even to collapsed states?  Are Somaliland’s rulers 
unreconstructed clan politicians, their power undermined by the demise of a radically 
marginalized Somalia, abandoned by global economic and strategic interests, leaving 
them to preside over isolated, contentious clan-based enclaves?  Or did Somalia’s 
collapse create in the north a reordered authority that accepts the social power of clan-
based organizations, but also finds new, sustainable ways to configure internal politics 
and relations with a world economy?  How do these people negotiate diplomatic 
norms that recognize only sovereign states and communities defined by clearly 
delimited boundaries? 
  I show how Somaliland society, and to a lesser extent, Puntland society 
reconstructed itself around three axes.  The first involves a shift toward greater 
reliance on solidarity groups such as clans, sub-clans and lineage groups that claim 
people’s loyalties and resources.  This organizing force in Somali society exists in 
interaction with other social factors.  As contrasting statements at the beginning of 
this work show, it can appear to be an immutable boundary of conflict, but in fact is 
fluid and within certain limits is socially reconstructed to respond to political and 
economic exigencies of collapsing central state authority.   
A second axis incorporates clandestine and informal economic channels in 
conflict.  It is not true that collapsing state control automatically empowers self-
interested predators who grab valuable economic resources.  Somalia’s recent 
experience shows that not all who exercise coercion do so to maximize their personal 
economic gains.
7  This still leaves unexplained why some pursue short-term personal 
economic interests and respond to global economic opportunities at the expense of 
community order, while others in similar circumstances do not, or at least not 
exclusively.  Some who turn their backs on immediate economic gains survive and 
successfully encourage others to cooperate with them, even amidst predatory rivals.  
In fact, some Somali war leaders forego fairly easy predation, while others use 
violence even where gains are marginal.  A key variable explaining this difference lies 
in the extent to which local notables were able to join a presidential clique and 
migrate into ‘official’ clandestine markets in the 1970s and 1980s to manipulate state 
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policies and grab state assets for personal benefit.  Meanwhile, those excluded from 
corridors of power, especially in the north, had to take refuge in their own clandestine 
markets in defiance of presidential power.  Highlighting differences in this aspect of 
state collapse is integral to identifying the social control of resources, and thus 
coercion after the disintegration of central authority in 1991.  By extension, the same 
elements of social control underlie the construction and eventual character of political 
communities that succeed the collapsed state.   
Changes in global economic norms and practices since the 1970s constitute a 
third axis.  Some of these changes reinforce connections between state collapse, 
greater marginality and seemingly endless conflict.  Other changes give some social 
networks chances to reconfigure economic ties to the rest of the world to their 
advantage.  To the extent that northern elites can fake adherence to global norms, or 
convince outsiders that clan and community business networks ought to be treated as 
a state, or claim that they are something that they really are not (such as a 
development organization or a business enterprise), they acquire resources and 
political tools to build a new, post collapsed identity and political community.  This 
‘beyond state collapse’ possibility suggests that the contemporary world economy and 
state system tolerate greater heterogeneity in strategies of engagement from the 
periphery than normally supposed.  This tolerance is unintended.  It arises out of the 
capacity of local leaders to represent their organizations as what outsiders may wish to 
see, to recruit external assistance for covert purposes, and to utilize norms and 
practices in ways other than what those who created and use them intended, much as 
Somalia’s president did when he destroyed his state.  Where this process occurs, it is 
central to understanding how globalization affects the construction of identity and the 
formation of political authority on the margins of world economic and diplomatic 
transactions. 
I argue that the nature of state collapse in the 1970s and 1980s, especially the 
distribution of social control over violence and markets, unintentionally left 
Somaliland leaders with more social raw material to reconstruct a single polity after 
1991—to ‘self-determine’—compared to southern counterparts.  Northerners had 
some flexibility to experiment, to tie nominally private businesses to the maintenance 
of central authority and order, and exploit norms in international commercial and 
diplomatic practice created for other purposes.  Lessons of Somaliland apply 
wherever communally based solidarities (as in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and 
southern Nigeria) connect people to global economic networks in a context of weak or 
absent states.  Subsequent political arrangements in Somaliland differ significantly 
from state-building models that privilege clear distinctions between public and private 
spheres of activity and centralized bureaucratic hierarchies.  Somaliland authorities 
preside over a hybrid organization—not exactly a state in a conventional sense—but 
state-like in the more basic sense of preserving order, as a pole around which citizens 
establish a shared identity, and able to manage the community’s conduct of relations 
with outsiders, all integral elements of self-determination. 
Political and institutional variation among Somalis occurs despite the fact that 
people in Somaliland and Puntland shared with the rest of Somalis similar economic 
constraints and historical experiences of state rule.  All Somalis lived under the cold 
war era nationalist governance.  All experienced its irredentist project in the 1970s.  
Especially important, all fell victim to the dramatic weakening of state institutions and 
faced fear, uncertainties and predations of political entrepreneurs attending the 
collapse of the state during the 1980s.  All regions face risk factors for fragmentation 
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potentials to create opportunities for political entrepreneurs.  In fact, northern 
Somalia, declaring itself the Republic of Somaliland, historically has been more 
marginal to world strategic and formal commercial concerns than the south and 
experienced greater violence in the late 1980s.  Distant from the capital, it was short-
changed in earlier efforts to build state institutions, a situation rooted in a British 
colonial policy emphasizing minimal administrative intervention.  It is shown below 
that colonial administration had a disruptive impact upon local social organization.  
Taken together, these factors make the emergence of an autonomous Somaliland 
capable of defining a political community and organizing its relations with the rest of 
the world even more baffling. 
Instrumentalist and rational choice approaches have a hard time explaining 
this outcome with reference to conventional calculations of group fears and individual 
gain.  Somaliland especially suggests other instances of non-occurrence or early 
cessation of war in other places.  While a rational choice model for post state collapse 
violence and persistent conflict may explain the violent warfare and the collapse of 
states in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it fails to account for the relative 
absence of violence in places like Georgia’s Ajaria and Abazhidze regions.  Likewise, 
Dagestan and Ingushetia attract little attention for their absence of wars.  Yet they are 
among the most ethnically diverse polities of their size, sharing borders with war-torn 
Chechnya, and are targets of numerous provocations of ethnic entrepreneurs eager to 
create security dilemmas among these communities.  Meanwhile, Chechen neighbors 
fight Russians, and when not facing invaders, they fight each other.   
One could attribute good sense and foresight to political actors, ex post.  Doing 
so glosses over highly unpredictable, violent and threatening environments and erratic 
decision making processes that characterize even those cases that avoid massive 
conflict and communal competition.  It downplays the salience of variables such as 
ethnically defined units that served as the basis of Soviet administration and that 
should have heightened ethnic tensions during periods of uncertainty, much as the 
first quote at the front of this work attributes continuing Somali conflicts to pervasive 
clan affiliation in politics there.  As throughout the Somali space, entrepreneurs in all 
these cases exploit clandestine commercial networks in niche sectors of regional 
economies and play a major role in controlling external financial resources to these 
societies.  People throughout the margins of the world economy, whether they fight or 
peaceably reorganize their communities in some different fashion, contend with the 
breakdown of old economies, declining subsidies from former colonial powers or 
superpower patrons, and fighting nearby that exposes them to the risk of contagion of 
disorder and fear.  Furthermore, Somaliland’s diaspora represents a larger percentage 
of total population and contributes more to societal income than any other major 
region of the Somali space.  According to Collier this manner of economic and social 
externalization should lead to a greater likelihood of conflict,
8 when in fact it is 
compatible with the opposite. 
What these cases, and Somaliland and Puntland in detail here shows is that 
state collapse and shifts in the global environment can be compatible with the 
formation of orderly multi-communal polities that are able to manage their 
connections with the global economy, even as they are extremely marginal to it.  
While it is not a formula for organizing polities that will have great weight in the 
economic or political councils of global society, these conditions are compatible with 
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the more modest claim that the destruction of states amidst economic globalization 
need not spell the end to local political order and peaceful economic engagement with 
the world economy.  It is unlikely that this political project will generate nation-state 
identities of the sort seen among dominant states, as indeed independent Somalia 
failed to become.  Instead, the organization of identity and political community adapts 
to manage connections with the rest of the world within constraints and adaptations to 
marginality.   
Divergent outcomes are explained in this work in an institutional framework 
shaping the calculus of opportunities, much like those who attribute conflict and 
networks leading to state collapse to rational calculations of vulnerability and fear.  
Institutions are not limited to clan, ethnic groups, or remnants of the collapsing state.  
They include novel business and legal arrangements within networks in the world 
economy, diasporas, and new alliances with non-state international agencies.  They 
may or may not be rooted in custom and tradition, but are central to regulating who is 
prestigious, who gets resources, who is considered legitimate, and most important, 
who exercises coercion.  Douglass North identified them in his classic broad 
definition of institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the 
humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction’.
9  In the cases here these 
institutions include unofficial and clandestine linkages, which often play an integral 
role in how local leaders construct their authority.  Somali overseas traders, for 
example, have long relied upon inter-clan networks of trust and accommodation for 
economic survival.  The persisting lack of international recognition of Somaliland’s 
sovereignty encourages authorities in Hargeisa, the country’s capital, to continue to 
place a premium on these accommodations.  But it also forces authorities to contract 
out state services to local communal enterprises in lieu of the economic regulatory 
opportunities and access to global commercial practices that outsiders’ formal 
recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty would permit. 
Four tentative hypotheses incorporate this modified institutional approach to 
explaining divergent experiences with conflict and identity formation in the wake of 
state collapse in the cases examined below: 
One: Unofficial, non-state institutions, including those that respond to global 
economic shifts and increased marginality, in some instances reduce risks of 
fragmentation that come with state collapse.  The pursuit of a state-building 
project and the consolidation of identity around new syncretic adaptations to 
global conditions can be explained with reference to informal, mediating 
institutions that defuse inter-clan (and inter-ethnic) security dilemmas. 
 
Two: When formal and informal institutional frameworks favour old informal 
patronage networks and clandestine economic channels over the interests of 
new or outsider elites, the successful intervention of clan (or ethnic) 
entrepreneurs is less likely, reducing the risks of violence. 
 
Three: When elites adapt old informal institutions to maintain an old state or 
build a new one, the risk of fragmentation is lower.  New institutions and 
channels of resources such as roundtables, national conferences, NGO aid, and 
outside military intervention can increase security dilemmas, offer new niches 
for political entrepreneurs, and thus increase risk of political fragmentation. 
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Four: If internal conditions noted above are met, local actors are able to 
exploit opportunities in the international economy to pursue self-
determination.  These strategies counterbalance and manipulate otherwise 
strong pressures implicit in international norms and laws that otherwise 
undermine self-determination efforts outside the framework of existing 
boundaries of globally recognized states. 
 
Taken together, these hypotheses acknowledge that marginal status in global 
economic and political networks can become political tools in the hands 
entrepreneurs.  This can take the form of exploiting inter-clan or inter-ethnic conflicts.  
It is also compatible with strategies that do a better job of containing violence, and are 
capable of sustaining more diverse political communities, though not in the mold of 
old fashioned nation-states. 
   Some scholars cite an immutable ‘call of kinship’ and durable ‘ethnocratic 
state’
10 predating colonial rule to explain the failure to sustain a centralized state in 
Somalia after 1990.  In this work I recognize that clan and lineage play important 
roles in Somali politics and are crucial units of analysis.  A Somali scholar, for 
example, identifies six major clans and at least 67 sub-clans that have become 
defensive networks against predation in the 1990s.
11  Clans are taken as basic 
determinants of social order elsewhere such as in Chechnya:  ‘in peacetime, they 
recognize no sovereign authority and may fragment into a hundred rival clans’.
12  Yet 
if social structure, the subject of the next section, plays an important role in shaping 
the organization of conflict, assumptions of immutability do not explain why some 
clan groups are able to contain entrepreneurs of violence in their midst while others 
cooperate with them or become their targets.  If, as propositions above propose, 
people in these social units can tailor their own organization, procedures and solutions 
to concrete circumstances, then it is more useful to look at clan and lineage structures 
through the lens of political and economic institutions, both formal and informal in 
this light.  In that case, colonial rule emerges as an important influence on social 
organization and social control of resources used in warfare in the 1990s.  Differences 
in colonial rule and local responses also help explain contemporary variations in 
politics. 
 
State Collapse and Violent Fragmentation in the South 
Italian administrators imported into Southern Somalia their own experiences 
with state economic planning and heavy state support for large-scale enterprises.  This 
tight connection between state policy in the capital and commerce appeared when the 
Duke of Abruzzi (famous for Alaskan and Himalayan adventures) in 1919 established 
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the Societa Agricola Italo Somala (SAIS) in the fertile river valleys of southern 
Somalia.   He and other concession holders discovered that they could not attract 
workers from among the Gosha people of the area that had migrated to these river 
valleys from the Zanzibar coast in the pre-colonial era.  Small holders were reluctant 
to leave their farms and trade social obligations and protections of family and lineage 
based production for wages.  European concessionaires identified the problem as 
following from the tendency of local elders to discourage young men from accepting 
paid labor that would undermine elders’ control over bride price.  Oral histories from 
the Jubba River Valley cite worries over the potential for local disruption that loss of 
elder control over matrimony would cause.  If young men could afford to marry 
whomever they pleased, this would favour some families over others, perhaps 
permanently.  This risked giving young men means to ignore local sensibilities 
concerning what constituted appropriate marital matches, which involved concerns 
about family alliances and redress for past wrongs or disadvantage,
13 all social 
constraints that are important later if one is interested in controlling fighters or freeing 
them to prey on communities. 
The launch of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia from Somalia in 1935 helped to 
‘solve’ this labour problem.  The conscription of 40,000 Somali troops gave Italian 
officials the means to forcibly remove local farmers from their land and give it to 
Italian enterprises.  Removing young men from among settled populations in southern 
river valleys, disrupted local food production in the late 1930s.  Food shortages and 
higher prices ensured that more local people sought wage labour contracts, some of 
which provided food as in-kind compensation.  Some young men discovered what 
elders feared, that employment on plantations growing bananas for the Italian market 
freed them from local customary constraints.  Employers also recruited young women 
to provide workers with wives from outside the area to convince their workers to 
settle on plantations.
14  This change increased matrimonial options for young men but 
undermined the role of married women in elders’ constructions of flexible, cross 
cutting ties between local lineages.
15 
Heavy state subsidies for commercial farms also initiated a pattern that 
outlived the Somali state in the 1990s of drawing powerful actors from the capital into 
southern economic and political affairs.  It was the intention of colonial administrators 
from the start that large-scale commercial agriculture be distributed according to 
political criteria, not simply efficiency.  Specifically, investment was designed to 
uproot local producers’ control over land and force them to engage fully with a 
national economy.  By the mid 1930s SAIS became Italy’s main banana supplier and 
Somalia’s largest commercial agricultural enterprise behind the shield of import 
tariffs and state subsidies. The export quota survived the collapse of the Somali state 
through terms of the Lomé Conventions that protected Somali banana exports to the 
European Union up to 1999.  This colonial policy resembles later policies of ‘national 
self-sufficiency’ that masked capital-based elites’ manipulation of state economic 
policies to divert assets for themselves and weaken regional power bases of rival 
politicians.  This patronage-based allocation of economic opportunities drew outsiders 
into the region to control land and monopolize access to economic opportunities with 
                                                 
13 Kenneth Menkhaus, Rural Transformation and the Roots of Underdevelopment in Somalia’s Lower 
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help from the coercive force of the state to back up their claims.  When violence 
increased in the 1980s, this elite was able to replace state militias with young men of 
their own kin from outside the area.  These young men were refugees from conflict in 
other regions, freed from customary limits that their home communities would have 
exercised over their use of violence.   
Thus economic expansion and government revenue in Italian Somalia and the 
independent Somali state did not develop on the basis of global competitiveness.  
Instead it relied on violent accumulation and privileged connections to political 
authority in the capital.  Colonial officials used this strategy to bolster a formal 
economy export market that could provide revenues to the state.  Despite the eventual 
diminishment of formal state control over transactions, colonial policy resembled later 
practice in that beneficiaries relied upon the support of key officials—later, patronage 
bosses—who used coercion and public asserts to ensure commercial success.  For 
example, 1955 banana exports to Italy provided $7.6 million of the colony’s total 
exports of $10.8 million only because SAIS still enjoyed prewar tariff exemptions and 
state-regulated pricing in Italy.  A World Bank team estimated that Somali bananas 
cost 40 percent more to produce and ship to Italy than did West African and Canary 
Island bananas.
16  Likewise, SAIS also produced textiles, soap, and sugar for local 
consumption at 40 percent above world prices, again with the benefit of tariff 
protection and easy access to state credits, policies that continued after colonial rule.  
Thus the World Bank report accurately predicted that Somalia would require heavy 
financial support long after achieving independence in 1960, a responsibility that 
expanded with large-scale aid projects that boosted commercial farming to include 
about 20 percent of all farming land in southern Somalia’s river valleys.
17   
Despite state support for agriculture—or rather because of it—Italian Somalia 
entered the 1950s heavily reliant upon direct subsidies from Rome to pay for 
administration.  From 1951 to 1957, the colony generated average annual revenues of 
only $5.4 million, requiring an additional Italian government subsidy averaging $9 
million.
18  ‘The hard facts’, wrote investigators, ‘are that the traditional sectors of the 
economy offer little prospect for rapid expansion, while European agriculture has 
grown up on a largely artificial basis’.
19  This did not deter multilateral creditors and 
foreign donors from taking the burden of financing projects after independence in 
1960.  During the 1960s and 1970s foreign donors and creditors supported a large 
expansion of plantation agriculture.  From Independence to 1981, 18 percent of 
remaining small holders in the Jubba River Valley had their communal and private 
holdings forcibly expropriated to state farms, not including land lost to reservoirs.  
This was usually done without compensation.  The impact on local communities was 
more dramatic than figures suggest, since water diversions to large irrigation schemes 
left additional land unfertile.
20   
Foreign aid enhanced the importance of commercial farms in elite political 
strategies and increased the disruptive impact of state ‘development’ strategies on the 
                                                 
16 Figures and assessment from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘The 
Economy of the Trust Territory of Somaliland’, (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1957), 63. 
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local population.  Foreign support for the three largest commercial farms in the Jubba 
area during the period 1976 to the late 1980s totaled at least $325 million, while direct 
state aid exceeded $50 million annually, a considerable sum given the country’s GDP 
of $1.7 billion in 1987.
21  Privatization of enterprises, begun in 1981, reinforced close 
ties between political power and one of the country’s primary economic assets.  A 
1975 land tenure law expanded the assets available for patronage through giving legal 
means to civil servants and businessmen who could get government backing to claim 
village lands that were not included in commercial farms.  Registration of titles 
became ‘a political rather than an economic process’ reported a foreign technical 
expert.  ‘The successful individual is one that has contacts in the bureaucracy, 
knowledge of how to “work the system”, clan and personal ties with high government 
officials’, at the expense of the mostly Gosha small holders who held land on the basis 
of custom and lineage ties solidified through marriage.
22  The land grab in southern 
areas alienated a further 6,000 ha in addition to the 16,000 ha lost to plantations, 
increasing the importance of this region as a source of political patronage beyond its 
value as a recipient of foreign aid, and put most of the region’s economy under 
control of powerful outsiders.
23 
The top-down merging of political networks and official economic policies 
destroyed local customary authorities’ capacity to control resources.  It also helped 
determine the contours of conflict in the 1990s, since it drew into the region outside 
elites of mixed origins, several of whom became important political actors in the river 
valleys by virtue of their positions in the hierarchy of the military dictatorship in the 
capital.  Their economic power was tied to the coercive power of the state.  As state 
control diminished in the 1980s, they developed their own capacity to act as political 
entrepreneurs to recruit and field armed forces.  The significance of colonial and 
nationalist policies, however, lay in providing these actors with tools to become 
violent entrepreneurs as these policies weakened local capacity to resist this process. 
Southern river valleys consequently became a site of frequent conflict since 
1991.  Control over major plantations played key roles in the strategies of two major 
militia leaders in the early 1990s.  General Mohammed Aydeed, who had held 
positions in the government in the 1980s, and his backers provided land in the river 
valleys on which disaffected mooryaan (‘dispossessed ones’) could settle.  Aydeed 
used the attractions of this region to recruit followers from his own Habr Gidir clan to 
join his faction of the United Somali Congress (USC).  Other strongmen from the 
Barre regime saw a strategy of survival in southern farms.  Aydeed’s principal 
businessman backer, Mogadishu-based Osman Ato, organized the looting of farm 
equipment, then provided backing to set up militia-controlled plantations.  Ato already 
had a base in the area, since he had been allocated a farm in the 1980s that his sister 
ran.
24   Barre’s former defense minister, Adan Abdullahi Nur ‘Gabeeyow’ also used 
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southern farming lands as a patronage resource of his own once his president had fled 
to attract and organize fighters, first after teaming up with Col Omar Jess, and 
continuing after he switched to the side of General Mohammed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, 
another Barre crony and head of the Somali National Front (SNF). 
Continued exports of bananas to Europe provided hard currency to 
entrepreneurs, estimated to total $26 million in 1990, and still generated export 
incomes in the range of $6 to $8 million in 1994.
25  These resources and opportunities 
drew in more mooryaan from other regions for refuge, employment, and food.  Col. 
Omar Jess, for example, used the southern region as a base for displaced members of 
his Ogadeen clansmen who had fought in an earlier conflict once Jess recognized in 
1990 that his presidential patron was going to fall.  Thus the report of an aid worker in 
1995 reflected the presence of large numbers of armed outsiders: ‘In lower Jubba, the 
district commanders and militia are the only structure of authority…  There is no 
civilian administration.  Osman Ato’s farm is where the main commander is based’.
26  
Despite the absence of state-like administration, this merging of economic and 
coercive power shrank the social space for indigenous resistance.  Defensive groups 
of local farmers from the Shebelle and Jubba valleys such as the Somali African Muki 
Organization (SAMO) have remained weak because they lack access to hard currency 
with which to buy weapons and cannot recruit their own mooryaan from distant urban 
areas or other battlefields like their much stronger opponents. 
This organization of conflict hardly counts as a societal consensus on virtues 
of clan politics.  Instead it follows from a colonial, then national labour policy that 
undermined local customary contract arrangements and political institutions based 
upon elders’ control of marriage and land allocation.  These changes indicate that 
woman once played an important role in maintaining flexibility in lineage boundaries 
and thus in political arrangements.  As outsiders disrupted local matrimonial customs, 
then seized local farms, local people were unable to control enough resources to 
oppose these interlopers.  Indigenous people and newcomers alike became ‘stabilized’ 
around rigid lineage identities as a consequence of the coercion, then outright violence 
of economic policies that created security dilemmas for entire communities.  Denied 
means or incentives to make local political accommodations, newcomers petitioned 
patrons in the capital to hold onto their assets and positions.  Eventually they had to 
seek protection from clan militias that also served the same entrepreneurial purpose, 
except now in more outwardly violent ways.   
Indigenous inhabitants had fewer choices.  If they lacked weapons, they had to 
seek protection as subordinates to local armed groups, or take their chances in poorly 
armed home guard militias.  These rigidified lines of conflict fit the expectations of 
scholars that political entrepreneurs will exploit these security dilemmas to get control 
of local resources.  This is especially true among new arrivals who lacked 
mechanisms to settle disputes among themselves, since all were ‘foreigners’ who 
could call upon distant kinsmen to tip the balance of power.  The relative violence in 
southern regions illustrates the proposition above that outsider elites who had 
benefited from privileged access to the political networks of the crumbling state fit 
best into the expectations that state collapse and violent exploitation of resources will 
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lead to long-term conflict, rigidified ethnic defensive groups, and will fail to build 
large-scale political communities.  Economic globalization in this setting adds 
resources to sustain the battles of political entrepreneurs, and thus creates formidable 
obstacles to organizing stable political authority.  
 
Northern Variation in Marginality  
While Italian Somalia depended heavily upon subsidies to underwrite exports 
and maintain state agencies, officials in British Somaliland insisted that the colony 
remain economically ‘undisturbed’ and get by with a smaller state apparatus 
compared to its southern neighbour.  British administrative responses to the anti-
colonial resistance of Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hussan, the ‘Mad Mullah of 
Somaliland’, whose fighters held off British expeditionary forces for twenty years 
from 1900 to 1920, explains some of this caution.  ‘The expatriate administration’, 
wrote Lewis, ‘consequently received stern admonitions from London that nothing was 
ever to be done again that could possibly provoke the Somalis’.
27  Thus it appears that 
Somali regions experienced very different legacies of colonial rule, depending 
whether they were included in Italian or British realms.   
Differences in style, however, did not translate into dramatic variation in 
levels of colonial intrusion in local societies.  Albeit, British officers no doubt thought 
that direct rule and economic intervention of the Italian sort would lead to too much 
resistance, would be too costly, and would weaken the willingness of local leaders to 
collaborate with, or at least tolerate colonial rule.  These concerns informed the 
British doctrine of Indirect Rule elsewhere on the continent, which mandated 
appointment of customary authorities as agents of the colonial state wherever 
possible.  The legal and administrative goal in Somaliland was to concretize social 
organization, as understood by British officials.  This meant that while Italian officials 
were trying to destroy linage control over potential workers, British authorities 
recognized diya-paying groups as basic political institutions.  These were groups 
pledged to pay blood money to the families of victims of violence to resolve feuds.  
Diya is an element of customary law in that it regulates social interactions.  But it 
does not concern the standing of in individual before the law so much as the relations 
between groups.  Lewis takes these groups as integral to local society and stresses the 
minimal impact of colonial rule on local society, and even asserts ‘during the colonial 
period, hardly any attempt was made to artificially erect a system of Indirect Rule’.
28  
This interpretation conflicts with British colonial budgets that list stipends paid to 
individual headmen and observers who complained that appointees had an 
entrepreneurial tendency to make British colonial authority a tool for fighting their 
internal rivals or engaging in self-enrichment.
29 
Colonial rule actually did considerably change Northern Somalia.  The 
concretization of diya paying groups gave local headmen a stake in enforcing colonial 
ordinances, since transgressions netted them a portion of fines.  It was in British 
colonial administrative interests to reinforce the position of headmen, since diya gave 
justification to British ordinances prescribing collective punishment for infractions in 
lieu of a large and expensive bureaucracy.
30  The practice of collective punishment, in 
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which any member of the diya paying group could be fined or dispossessed even if 
another individual was suspected of an infraction, gave headmen an interest in 
ensuring that diya boundaries remained static.  Headmen wanted to rigidify social 
boundaries to make sure that individuals and families did not try to reinterpret their 
lineage to escape obligations incurred by people unknown or distant from them.  This 
artificial rigidity reinforced the colonial legal notion of blood group solidarity and 
recruited blood groups to control ‘members’ to avoid liability for their actions.
31  Thus 
British, like Italian administration, laid foundations for less flexible definitions of 
clanship.  This legacy also should aggravate group security dilemmas and provide 
opportunities for political entrepreneurs amidst conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, just as 
Italian and nationalist economic policies did in the south.   
The British north, however, lacked the Italian south’s history of state 
appropriation of economic assets on behalf of outsiders, at least during the colonial 
era.  This condition continued into Barre’s regime and became a major factor in 
shaping the local development of social regulation of violence in the 1990s and 2000s 
examined in detail below.  Unlike every other British colony in Africa, except the 
Gold Coast (where resistance to colonial rule also resulted in armed struggle), colonial 
authorities levied no head taxes, subsisting instead on taxes on trade to pay for 
administration.
32  From 1951 to 1957, average annual British Somaliland internal 
revenues amounted to only £860,000.  The colony was distinguished as one of the few 
that required regular subventions from the Exchequer.  London’s subsidy, along with 
postwar Colonial Development Corporation grants, added an average of £1.2 million 
to the colonial budget during the 1950s. 
33  As in the Italian colony, administration 
required subsidies for about two-thirds of its expenditures, though British officials 
rejected statist pretensions of their Italian colleagues.  Regardless, colonial authorities 
in both places saw little prospect for viability without outside financial support, and 
London shed its burden upon Somali Independence in 1960. 
Meanwhile, British officials pursued their goals by simply foregoing economic 
development.  Lewis, then a member of the British Somaliland civil service, reported 
that when he arrived in Hargeisa in 1955 about 200 senior officers ran the entire 
colony.
34  An official from London charged with charting a development plan for the 
colony in the 1950s complained that the local administration actually resisted the 
whole notion of economic development.  He was astounded that, taking prewar 
London’s fears of disorder to heart, they feared social disruption and ‘modern’ social 
pressures, and to avoid these evils, they actively defied postwar economic policy 
directives from London that local officials considered imprudent.
35  ‘As a result’, 
reports Lewis, ‘the traditional attitudes of pastoral Somali society were even more 
strongly entrenched in the north, while the south, by contrast, appeared in many 
respects more modernist in outlook’.
36  Local society may have seemed ‘traditional’ 
and ‘in comparison with other segmentary lineage societies fictional kinship seems 
strikingly rare’,
37 although administrative intervention in local social categories 
suggests otherwise. 
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Given these similarities, it is even more baffling that armed entrepreneurs in 
the south failed to build a stable political order after 1991 while armed northern 
leaders found ways to manage conflict, build cross cutting alliances and rein in 
violence without the aid of outside force or subsidies.  As evidence below shows, 
colonial experiences were not decisive in shaping contemporary identity and political 
organization, though they are important for their significant influence on shaping 
social categories and the social distribution of resources.  The key variable shaping 
these outcomes lies in the nature of rule in post-colonial Somalia, specifically the 
extent to which local elites either joined with or were excluded from political 
networks that dominated commerce, as the fate of commercial farms and state 
economic development policies in southern Somalia showed.   
 
Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Start of State Collapse  
The 1960 unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia as an 
independent state did not result in a reduction of external financial support, nor the 
economic irrelevancy that IMF investigators and scholars predicted.  Though no 
magnet for foreign investment, Somalia’s rulers discovered that they could turn 
prerogatives of sovereignty into tools to attract external economic assets.  Somalia’s 
government perfected the art of playing to the diplomatic and strategic interests of 
former colonial rulers, superpowers and others willing to exchange aid for affirmation 
of a particular ideology, diplomatic alignment, or access to military bases.
38 Rulers 
used these resources to attract popular legitimacy and manage domestic political 
rivals.  The latter presented more pressing challenges and dominated the conduct of 
Somalia’s external relations.  As southern Somali agricultural projects shows, capital-
based strongmen used foreign aid to build political networks that later provided key 
agents of violence and armed groups of followers when central control over this 
network collapsed.  Ironically, the preferred strategies for building a state and political 
community on the margins of the global economy after 1960 also lay at the heart of 
state collapse and violent community fragmentation after 1990. 
The high water mark of this centrally managed political project began with the 
coup of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre on 21 October 1969.  Initially it appeared to 
be a state-building project.  Barre (a former member of the Italian Somaliland and 
British wartime interim administration police) announced that all speakers of the 
Somali language should be unified in a single state, and supported crash literacy 
programs to propagate a new Somali script.  In 1970 he unveiled an official ‘Scientific 
Socialist’ ideology and invited the Soviet navy to lease the deepwater port of Berbera, 
in former British Somaliland.  Barre took ideological cues and foreigner’s cash where 
he could find it, combining Islamic poetry with the centralizing vision of Lenin, the 
cult of personality of North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung and advice from Western creditors 
and donors who in fact remained his primary financial supporters even during his 
alignment with the Soviet Union.  Barre also admitted to admiring Benito Mussolini, 
who he called ‘my former commander’.  While Barre was insistent on ideological 
consistency, he did maintain a consistent pursuit of a centrally organized state-
building project, whether of fascist or socialist inspiration.   In this sense, Barre 
responded to the global incentives of his time, a political and economic world that 
supported state regulation of domestic economies and that provided financial support 
to leaders of new states who embarked on these projects.  
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Barre went even further, and vigorously pursued an irredentist project of 
consolidating all Somali speakers in a single state.  This translated into official 
support for a Northern Frontier District Liberation Front in Kenya and a Front de 
Libération de la Côtes des Somalis in neighboring French Somaliland.
39  Somali state-
building continued with the infiltration of Ogadeeni clan fighters of the Somali-Abo 
Liberation Front (SALF) and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) to 
‘reclaim’ ethnic Somali territory in Ethiopia’s Ogaden after a coup in 1975 amidst 
challenges from separatist movements in Eritrea, Tigray and Oromo.   SALF and 
WSLF ties to the Somali government were tight enough that a government office in 
Mogadishu distributed their propaganda in the consolidated Bulletin of Somali 
Liberation Fronts, denouncing ‘Abyssinian colonialism’ and calling for these regions 
to (re)join the Somali nation.
40  By March 1978, however, Ethiopian counter-attacks 
reached Somali territory after Ethiopia’s rulers made their own bid for Soviet aid.  
Barre’s attack on Ethiopia had consequences decades later as Ethiopian leaders 
concluded that keeping Somalia very weak and disorganized after Barre’s fall in 1991 
was integral to their own security.  Barre’s Soviet backers abandoned him in 1978, 
preferring instead to align with a seemingly more genuine Marxist-Leninist ruling 
party in Ethiopia (which also is ten times more populous than Somalia).  This came on 
top of the bad news for Barre in 1977 that French Somaliland voters rejected union 
with Somalia and opted for independence as the Republic of Djibouti in a referendum. 
Despite Barre’s loss of Soviet patronage, his regime managed to find a new 
external source of income.  The US government established its own (more modest) 
military presence and gave Barre’s regime more than $800 million in aid.  A quarter 
of this was devoted to military expenditures.  Italy was more generous.  Conveniently 
for Barre, his Italian patrons were willing to include local politicians in insider deals 
in providing over a billion dollars in the 1980s for more than one hundred projects, 
which contributed to Barre’s role as a distributor of largesse to his informal political 
network of associates, both inside government and in ‘private’ (but politically well 
connected) business.   
Overall, outside aid generated $2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 
1989, making Somali people Africa’s greatest beneficiaries of aid on a per capita 
basis at that time.
 41  The geographic, sectoral and political distribution of aid, 
however, shows that most Somalis benefited very little as aid, not just from his Italian 
patrons, became a major source of corruption and kickbacks to regime favourites.  
The extreme dependence of the country on foreign aid for 90 percent of recorded 
development spending underlines the centrality of Barre in all avenues of economic 
life—as manager of formal state allocations and as patron to political allies—at the 
expense of broader community or commercial efforts.  Barre’s domination of these 
economic channels also entrenched his power in the institutional frameworks of 
communities targeted for development spending.  He used these initiatives to overlay 
his own political network over old informal local networks.  The consequence later 
would be that informal mediating institutions such as xeer and the authority of 
‘traditional’ leaders would be weakest in these areas once sustained conflict broke out 
in the late 1980s.  Thus economic globalization in this manner laid the groundwork 
for state collapse.  When examined in its patrimonial context, it also provides a guide 
                                                 
39 On official support for irredentist groups, see John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the 
Horn of Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 169-201. 
40 Pamphlets in the author’s possession. 
41 John Sommer, ‘Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990-1994’, (Washington, DC: 
Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 7. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS100   Page 16 
for predicting which communities would organize their own responses to state 
collapse and which ones would not, and how each category would respond to 
economic opportunities in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Meanwhile, agricultural projects and programs absorbed 22 percent of 
development spending in the 1980s, with 90 percent of that allocated to large-scale 
commercial crop farming.  Favoured groups benefited from the construction of dams, 
irrigation and plantation farming in the south.  This southern area was the dominant 
beneficiary of this category of spending.
42  Foreign experts complained that this 
priority excluded more numerous pastoralists, especially those in northern areas 
affected by conflict that continued long after the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, even 
though agriculture spending rose as a proportion of development spending during this 
period.
43  Further accentuating the social differentiation that development spending 
promoted, social service expenditures fell from 6.3 percent of development spending 
in 1975 to less than one percent in 1989.  By the 1980s, even this small amount was 
reserved in large part to provide housing for faculty and staff at the National 
University in Mogadishu.
44 
Even though state support declined politically favoured groups continued to 
benefit.  Industrial firms, for example, received 35 percent of development spending 
in 1975, dropping to 10 percent in the mid 1980s.  This decline reflected the regime’s 
acceptance of creditor advice to privatize industrial enterprises.  This was carried out 
on the basis of political favouritism, and was immediately followed with massive 
manipulation of credit markets to benefit regime cronies.  Administrative regulations 
depressed formal market interest rates for credit to –80 percent in real terms in 1984, 
compared to marginal positive rates in the late 1970s.
45  Not efficient in economists’ 
terms, negative rates ensured that credit would be distributed to politically powerful 
groups and businessmen.  Lucky recipients later paid their creditors in severely 
depreciated local currency, which effectively meant that the state provided its 
favourites with a bonus for holding these loans.  The fiscal demands of this policy 
meant that the politically marginalized had to seek credit on their own in much more 
expensive informal markets that did not enjoy patronage from the state.  Alternatively 
they could leave the country in search of economic opportunities abroad.  This further 
marginalizing politically disfavoured groups from Barre’s informal patronage 
networks, though it would have positive significance in later years when their 
community leaders would find that they had influence over these overseas sources of 
income independent of strongmen associated with Barre’s regime. 
Likewise, policy failure coupled with a steady flow of foreign aid helped civil 
servants migrate into regime-sanctioned clandestine channels.  By 1989, civil servants 
were paid only three to four percent of the real value of their 1975 salaries, and had to 
support themselves through corruption, bribes and kickbacks.  Despite declining 
salaries, Barre increased civil service employment from approximately 20,000 in 1969 
to over 56,000 in 1983.  This made association with foreign financed development 
projects a vital part of the survival strategies of civil servants.  Uncertainty and 
scarcity helped turn these projects into an even more valuable political resource for 
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Barre.  A foreign consultant observed, however, that the civil service lost a 
disproportionate portion of more educated employees, particularly those who came 
from the north who Barre regarded as less desirable as political clients.
46  As shown 
below, politically marginalized communities in the north were forced to became more 
adept at exploiting the economic opportunities of clandestine markets and overseas 
employment on their own, often in defiance of the regime and in conflict with 
clandestine rackets that regime favourites ran. 
Even when Barre’s irredentist adventure and destructive economic policies 
brought growing popular insecurity, foreign relief aid offered him additional political 
resources that he could plow back into his ‘official’ clandestine economy.  UN 
officials, for example, complained that $100 million in relief aid to refugees of the 
1977-78 war was distributed on the basis of clan leadership loyalties to Barre, and was 
used to reinforce the control of regime strongmen who were responsible for 
controlling distribution of relief aid in the camps.
47  Aid workers testified that food 
was pilfered from convoys and sold in local markets with the connivance of local 
officials.  UN officials used this same complaint over pilferage to justify intervention 
in the early 1990s.  Nor is it coincidence that the same individuals and armed groups 
were responsible for this use of violence in both periods, though prior to 1990 this 
was an informal ‘official’ state policy, while freelance in the latter.  One aid worker 
estimated that three quarters of all supplies were stolen, with some going directly to 
pro-Barre militias that attacked clans that Barre believed opposed his rule.
48  Massive 
over counting of refugees, 1.5 million by Somali government estimate versus 650,000 




Clandestine Markets, Political Entrepreneurs, and the Destruction of Southern 
Elite Autonomy 
The failure of the Ogaden invasion posed a serious challenge to Barre’s 
authority, not just because of the military defeat and challenge to the irredentist 
project.  The 1978 defeat and continuing armed clashes with Ethiopia through the 
early 1980s changed how Barre ruled.  Barre could no longer mobilize a broad-based 
coalition on the basis of a vague socialist ideological appeal (backed with visible 
evidence of general economic development), nor could he unify his country in a 
regional state-building military campaign.  Instead, he shifted toward a more thorough 
reliance on manipulating markets and directing the violent predations of strongmen 
who were allied with his regime.  This key variable, already seen in reference to 
southern farming areas, shaped the physical and social distribution of insider 
beneficiaries and outsiders to Barre’s rule.  Ironically, those who were left out—
usually against their will—gained social tools that they used later to impose order and 
build defensive networks against local predation and disruptive elements of the world 
economy.  Thus this analysis locates the primary cause of Somalia’s disruption as a 
consequence of the last two decades in the internal configuration of patronage politics 
and state collapse.  Economic globalization contributed to this process only insofar as 
resources and opportunities were channels in ways that undermined social cohesion, 
which was precisely the informal aim of Barre’s patrimonial strategy, along with 
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securing those resources for him to distribute at his personal discretion to his 
supporters.  Likewise, global economic transactions became the key either to later 
fragmentation or consolidation of communities, depending upon how those 
communities allocated those resources after the central state collapsed.  
Nor was Barre’s patrimonial strategy always successful, even when he 
dominated economic resources.  One of his own Daarood clansmen, Colonel Abdulahi 
Yusuf, led an attempted coup against Barre.  Abdulahi Yusuf was stationed in the 
northern part of the county amidst the half million Ogaden refugees from the 1977-78 
war and presided over the lucrative distribution and looting of foreign aid to refugees.  
Like Barre, Abdulahi Yusuf and these refugees hailed from the Daarood clan.  Despite 
these kinship ties (and undermining the notion that Somalia’s conflict derived from 
immutable clan identities), Barre took seriously the possibility that Abdulahi Yusuf 
could organize a mass-based uprising against his rule from these core members of 
Barre’s patronage network.  Abdulahi Yusuf found that he could sell his opposition to 
Barre for military and financial support from Ethiopia’s regime, which saw in 
Abdulahi Yusuf’s role as a political entrepreneur who could weaken their enemy in 
Mogadishu.  Abdulahi Yusuf used Ethiopian backing to form the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF), which took up arms against Barre’s regime. 
Abdulahi Yusuf’s defection and suspicions that others might use clan 
solidarities and positions in his patronage network against him alerted Barre to the 
dangers of delegating too much responsibility to his subordinates, especially those 
who controlled coercive force and resources in their own right, to hold onto power.  
Yet the war with Ethiopia entailed increasing the army from 22,000 well-armed 
soldiers in 1977 to over 50,000 troops in 1981 once Barre’s adversary benefited from 
Soviet aid and advice.  Many of these hastily mobilized soldiers owed more allegiance 
to specific commanders who recruited them than to Barre’s nationalist vision or 
centralized state.  By 1990, numbers reached 60,000 through forced conscription.
50  
Barre’s dependence on these regional strongmen within his own political network 
seriously limited his ability to mobilize people or resources in Somali society.   
Fortunately for Barre, Somalia’s increasing dependence on outsiders for aid 
facilitated his switch from a bureaucratic state-building project to a patronage network 
rooted in violent control over economic channels.  His strategy of ruling through 
manipulating access to economic opportunity made segments of the country’s elite 
beholden to Barre for personal wealth and security.  This neutralized the ability of 
clan elders to control resources on their own to resolve local conflicts, since official 
favour equipped local strongmen with means to appropriate these exchanges and 
resources for themselves and their followers.  Those beholden to Barre’s network still 
could patronize their own clan’s kinsmen.  This was Barre’s intention as well, since 
this gave Barre greater leeway to use his proxies to manipulate tensions between clans 
and within clan groups to divide not only his opposition, but also ensure that his allies 
never could mount a direct challenge to his rule.   
Barre chose his associates according to this calculus of instigating clan 
competition for favour.  ‘This’, wrote Lewis, was reflected in the popular code name 
‘“MOD” given to the regime.  M (Marehan) stood for the patrilineage of the 
President, O (Ogaden) for that of his mother, and D (Dulbahante) for that of his 
principal son-in-law, head of the national security service’.
51  This bias in Barre’s 
provision of patronage benefited already entrenched southern-based elites more than it 
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did northern ones who were more marginal to Barre’s original power base, and hence 
he trusted much less.  Even so, enterprising northerners could participate, and as seen 
below, would engage in violent predation to bolster their fortunes in competition with 
their colleagues after Barre’s fall.  Earlier, however, this arrangement gave the 
president excellent bases to sharpen and exploit competing security dilemmas within 
his own political clique.  Local power and access to wealth, even in clandestine 
economies, increasingly came from membership in the capital-based clique, an 
arrangement designed to harness the ambitions and violent strategies of political 
entrepreneurs in Barre’s divide-and-rule network. 
Barre confronted Abdulahi Yusuf’s challenge with this technique of selective 
arming of strategically placed clan based political entrepreneurs.  As Barre armed 
other Daarood sub-clans, Abdulahi Yusuf’s Majeerteen compatriots found themselves 
increasingly isolated and fair game for other groups that wanted to take advantage of 
the general political crisis to loot their politically marginalized neighbours.  This 
created a reciprocal rationality of fear among Daarood sub-clans as communities and 
their elders had to decide whether they would back their president or side with a 
potentially successful challenger.  Kinship should matter more in choices like this, 
since one wants to be able to count on receiving protection from one’s patron, even if 
the patron’s fortunes should decline.  Abdulahi Yusuf also had to contend with 
Barre’s efforts to appease segments of its broader Daarood membership with bribes to 
desert his SSDF.  This meant Abdulahi Yusuf’s sub-clan became even more 
exclusively associated with the SSDF.  This in turn caused the entire group to become 
suspect in the eyes of people, even among those who might otherwise join forces with 
them against Barre.  
Barre also armed Ogadeeni refugees to fight Isaaq communities in the north 
who he thought might be sympathetic to the plight of his other enemies, or perhaps 
join them in arms.  Supplied with government arms, Barre used his patronage of 
Ogadeni refugees to revive old conflicts over pasturage in Ethiopian territory with 
their Isaaq neighbors dating from the 1950s.  British forces had occupied shared 
pasture land in Ethiopia during World War Two, then returned it to Ethiopia in 1954 
with the proviso that northern (mostly Isaaq) pastoralists would continue to have 
access to pastures.  This was a bargain that was kept only intermittently.  WSLF 
fighters sought to exploit this grievance too, but could not join with Isaaqs to address 
this problem if the key to patronage from the capital for Ogadeenis lay in getting guns 
from Barre’s allies to attack other Somalis.  Attacks on Isaaq occurred within Somalia 
too.  During May of 1983, for example, Daarood Ogadeeni fighters killed 500 
northerners in a week of fighting in the Burao area.  Now conflict was taking on the 
character of a seemingly deeply rooted clan conflict.  Fighting thus mobilized more 
immediate personal interests in the framework of clan politics, as Lewis observed 
when he visited the region in the late 1980s: ‘Male Ogadeeni refugees [of the Daarood 
clan] have been encouraged to take over the remains of Isaaq shops and houses in 
what are now ghost towns.  Thus those who were received as refugee guests have 
supplanted their Isaaq hosts, many of whom—in this bitterly ironic turn of fate—are 
now refugees in the Ogaden’.
52  Through selective arming of Daarood Ogadeenis to 
target supposedly disloyal Daarood sub-clans, Barre deflected armed opposition and 
undermined prospects for any unified challenge to his rule.   
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Barre also promoted preferred supporters from among Oromo and Ogadeeni 
refugees to official positions in the north.  This hitched the ‘official’ clandestine 
economy to Barre’s favourites, since state office gave these appointees positions from 
which to skim substantial humanitarian aid for themselves.  Their exemption from 
enforcement of other laws and economic regulations gave these people privileged 
commercial positions from which to use their loot in the country’s clandestine 
economy, for example, in unofficially condoned smuggling operations.  Barre and his 
associates then were able to manipulate violence for the benefit of the state through 
tapping into other informal sectors of the economy.  Young men who sought access to 
clandestine economic opportunities quickly discovered that their best chance of 
improving their situation lay in joining a regime-approved patron who would supply 
them with guns, protection and access to economic opportunity on this basis of 
manipulated inter-clan tensions.  This allowed the president to exploit what a UN 
agency observed as a ‘synergy between two forces—increasing economic exclusion 
and social disintegration’.
53   Barre turned violence that might otherwise be directed 
toward his regime into a controlled political space with armed groups preying upon 
other citizens, leaving victim and predator unable to construct an alternative stable 
political order. 
The resulting chronic instability further exacerbated insecurity and created 
some opportunities for northern political entrepreneurs too.  Many Isaaq who faced 
‘official’ predation and who wanted to get their pasturage back sided with an armed 
Isaaq group within the WSLF, the ‘Fourth Regiment’ that Barre’s regime supplied 
with weapons.  They fought Barre’s other allies, in the process ensured that none 
became so strong that either could repeat the 1978 coup attempt.  Meanwhile, inter 
and intra-clan fighting over pastures in Ethiopia left Barre’s Ethiopian enemies with 
turmoil in their own neighbourhood.  Nor could Ethiopians support Barre’s enemies 
too strongly, lest their Somali clients use this aid to reclaim parts of Ethiopia’s 
Ogaden for themselves.  Their 1984 arrest of Abdulahi Yusuf and persistent meddling 
in the internal politics of the Isaaq opposition further divided these groups, even those 
that later became the core of the Somaliland administration.  Thus parochial politics 
overwhelmed even the façade of twentieth century liberation politics, a process that 
Barre’s economic politics from the late 1970s reinforced. 
 
The Political Economy of Forced Social Autonomy in the North 
At the start of this turmoil in 1977, foreign donors and creditors pressured 
Barre’s government to implement an economic reform programme, which included as 
its central prescription the deregulation of exchange rates.  They negotiated with their 
hosts what was called the franco valuta system, in which local businessmen could 
convert foreign remittances from Somalia’s estimated 250,000 overseas migrant 
workers earning $1.5 billion annually
54 at open market rates to pay for imported 
goods.  The official aim of the policy was to relieve a shortage of basic goods while 
tapping illicit imports of hard currency estimated to top $350 million into legal 
channels that could benefit the country’s depleted treasury.
55  By 1985 remittances to 
Somalia alone totaled an estimated $338 million, about fifteen times the entire wage 
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bill for the country’s formal sector.
56   Northerners contributed disproportionately to 
these remittances, reflecting the tendency of politically marginalized people to search 
for work in the Persian Gulf and further afield.  They did this rather than engage in 
what for them were more difficult efforts to get incorporated into the country’s 
increasingly pervasive patronage politics, compared to opportunities available to more 
politically favoured Somalis.
57  Isaaq also formed the core of a West European-based 
diaspora among those who worked in Britain’s merchant navy after the end of the 
Second World War.  Further Isaaq migration to Britain followed in the 1960s and 
1970s when political aspirants and would-be entrepreneurs lost out in patronage 
politics after independence, then more so after Barre’s 1969 coup. 
Instead of deregulating economic exchange, Barre’s informal manipulation of 
franco valuta accomplished the reverse.  He retained control over import licensing, 
which he distributed on the basis of political calculations.  Those already deeply 
entrenched in clandestine commerce and diversions of aid with this permission were 
especially well placed to benefit, since they could channel this capital into what were 
effectively legalized smuggling operations.  He used uncertainty to enhance his 
personal control over exchanges, ‘canceling’ franco valuta in 1982 (though 
application of this ‘cancellation’ was at Barre’s personal discretion), only to officially 
revive it in 1984.  Retention of other regulations also gave Barre’s regime tools to 
allow favoured entrepreneurs to undervalue imports, increasing the value of their 
franco valuta profits vis-à-vis competitors.  These manipulations reinforced the 
political nature of Somalia’s clandestine market as an instrument in Barre’s exercise 
of power.   
Meanwhile, politically marginalized groups continued to rely upon local 
solidarities to protect their transactions against inconsistent enforcement of laws and 
competition from the president’s business allies.  For example, Ali Mahdi, noted 
above as a big landowner in the south, then later a militia financier translated his 
presidential favour in the 1980s into a franco valuta assisted business empire.  Ali 
Mahdi owed his position to Barre’s protection and not to his Hawiye kin.  This gave 
him geographic and social flexibility, defined by Barre’s political network rather than 
on any claims he might make on his kinsmen by virtue of custom.  This left Ali Mahdi 
vulnerable to Barre’s machinations, and he was jailed in the early 1980s on suspicion 
of supporting a coup plot.  But he was rehabilitated in 1984 in time to profit from 
franco valuta.  Ali Mahdi then quickly became a major figure in Mogadishu business 
circles, largely through managing the Barre regime’s ties to Italian businesses, 
including those that offered access to sophisticated arms.
58  Ali Mahdi made an ideal 
associate for Barre, since his reliance on the president ensured that he would not have 
any real independent base of support.  The social context of Ali Mahdi’s power was 
reflected in his 1991 bid after Barre’s flight to get him recognized as ‘interim 
president’ on the basis of Italian diplomatic support and his ability to arm fighters, not 
for his status as a representative of a particular group of people or community.  These 
ties and their connection to arms acquisition reinforced the disruptive character of this 
new elite attached to a centralized and violent patronage network, then courted by 
foreigners once widespread fighting broke out in the 1990s. 
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Usman Ato, later to become a financier of Mohammed Aydeed, also 
consolidated his business position in the 1980s without having to face much of the 
burden of customary demands or constraints of clan networks from his home 
community.  Like Ali Mahdi, Usman Ato helped organize arms acquisitions for 
Barre’s government.  Usman Ato shared ‘official’ clandestine commercial ties to 
Aydeed, who had been exiled and then returned to Barre’s fold as a defense minister 
and key organizer of arms acquisitions in the 1980s.  Like Ali Mahdi, Barre punished, 
only to later rehabilitate both of these men into exploit new clandestine commercial 
networks, cementing their dependence upon him.  These men and their associates still 
became patrons to kinsmen, but fateful for future conflict, they did not owe their 
control over resources and business opportunities to approval from clan authorities or 
conformity to local social conventions.   
These men were the people best able to equip fighters, either young clansmen 
who came to cities to find jobs, or simply the adventurous, ambitious or desperate.  As 
junior members (or aspiring members) of centralized networks, these young men 
known as mooryaan, or urban tough guys, sought relief from insecurity through 
finding some place in the businesses associated with Barre’s patronage networks.  
Their best chances for relief from poverty came through affiliating with strongmen 
who could arm them as political muscle or as enforcers in the regime-favoured 
channels of the clandestine economy.  Like their patrons, ‘these bands were 
constituted more according to personal affinities during the last years of Siyaad Barre, 
and defined by the same types of activities, or by habitation in the same parts of the 
capital’.
59  This is hardly clan warfare in the sense of primordial tendencies toward 
conflict.  Instead, it is a good illustration of a security dilemma conducive to forcing 
would-be victims to seek out a protector, often along kinship lines, to mitigate threats 
or to share in loot.  Barre’s political strategy shows that he recognized that this was 
especially true if fighters and patrons were in ‘foreign’ territory where the defensive 
moves of local communities would seem especially threatening to outsiders who, like 
them, found themselves free from the social bonds of customary means of mitigating 
conflict.  Likewise, ‘foreigners’ who are outside one’s social networks are easier to 
loot.  In this sense, conflict in the 1990s was an intensification of Barre’s informal 
techniques of rule through patronage and regime imposed insecurity.
 60 
Once Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991, business kingpins continued to attract 
young men to fight on their behalf.  In regions where these strongmen could recruit 
and where their business enterprises generated income, clan elders ‘found themselves 
attempting to negotiate with young militiamen and bandits from distant clans rather 
than with “peer” elders’, a situation which one scholar blamed for the failure of 
customary conflict resolution strategies in the south.
61  This pointed to ways that 
mobility and allegiance to a new elite based upon appropriation of informal markets 
and state assets undermined the social control that customary authorities and social 
obligations once ensured. 
Some northern businessmen viewed Barre’s franco valuta cancellation in 1982 
and again in 1985 as part of an effort to single them out for punishment and to reassert 
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political control over patronage and clandestine businesses.  Some businessmen in the 
northeast from the Majerteen community complained that few in this region could 
take advantage of franco valuta in the first place because businessmen were subject to 
predations of private militias that exacted collective punishment in the 1980s after the 
appearance of Abdulahi Yusuf’s SSDF challenge to Barre.
62 
Northern economic fortunes suffered further harm from Barre’s regime, but in 
ways that increased its future autonomy from developments closer to Mogadishu.  In 
1981, for example, the government imposed a fifty percent tariff on the north’s 
growing livestock trade to Saudi Arabia, forcing local exporters to rely more heavily 
upon kinship networks to guarantee transactions across international borders outside 
the state’s regulatory reach.
63   This trade is estimated to have been worth several tens 
of millions of dollars annually through the early 1980s.
 64  A northern delegation that 
went to Mogadishu to petition Barre to remove these charges returned home when 
they were threatened with arrest.
65  Meanwhile, this tariff benefited the economically 
inefficient Trans-Suba Livestock Project, funded with Italian and World Bank finance 
that supported this new source of patronage positions and payouts to regime 
favourites.
66 
This political and economic marginalization led northern businessmen to seek 
local protection from predatory exactions from officials.  Clan solidarities offered 
them the best prospects for shielding commerce from harm.  Clan based credit 
systems, or abbans, already existed to manage business networks that remained 
outside Barre’s political grip.  They had offered some protection from nationalization 
policies beginning in 1972, when Barre’s regime took over much of the formal 
economy’s financial sector.  Mogadishu based elites who took over these businesses 
had ready access to subsidized credit via state agencies.  Meanwhile, abbans enabled 
local businessmen to tap into locally organized informal remittance systems in which 
overseas senders and local recipients relied upon customary clan authorities to 
guarantee contracts, protect members, and adjudicate disputes outside state 
bureaucracies and the informal patronage institutions that hade become increasingly 
inaccessible to them.  Several scholars estimate that 90 percent of foreign exchange 
from commerce in 1981 (as distinct from foreign aid to refugees and to Mogadishu) 
was generated through this trade in livestock, much of which was organized through 
abbans in coordination with remittance flows.
67  
Self-identification of outsider status appeared as local businessmen compared 
themselves to Greek, Lebanese and Indian commercial diasporas that have relied upon 
tight-knit families and community self-help organizations to survive hostile political 
environments.  Northern commerce also made use of the geographic proximity to 
Djibouti, which became independent of France since 1977.  Djibouti’s government 
offered its territory as a low tax entrepôt for transshipment of smuggled goods in and 
out of adjacent Somali territory to benefit from the need of northern entrepreneurs to 
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find a more secure environment from which to organize their transactions.  This 
enabled the Djibouti business community and the country’s treasury to benefit from 
their neighbours and clan kinsmen to profit from the smuggling trade in livestock and 
other goods.
 68  Prior to technological developments in telecommunications, Djibouti 
also harboured trusted Somali financial intermediaries beyond the reach of Barre’s 
government or patronage network, and who would handle cash for migrants and 
businessmen and provide credit for those frozen out of Somalia’s formal sector and 
politically allocated franco valuta financial markets.  
Commercial exclusion from Barre’s patronage networks also shaped the 
organization of armed opposition in the north from the early 1980s.  The 1981 
founding of the Isaaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM), for example, 
owed much to the financial resources of the Isaaq diaspora community in Britain, 
among whom a receptive audience was found.  The role of clan elders in guaranteeing 
abban transactions of these migrants also ensured that clan elders on the whole 
exercised greater control over the finances and political processes of this group, 
compared to others involved in Somalia’s conflicts.
69  This was the result of 
circumstances, not northern virtue.  Furthermore, the SNM had to form in exile to 
escape Barre’s wrath.  Based in Ethiopia during its 1981-88 exile, it remained under 
tight control of Ethiopia’s President Mengistu.  Unlike southern-based militias after 
1989, SNM’s Ethiopian patron did not allow it to receive foreign aid from any single 
major donors, lest this give the group the autonomy to defy Mengistu in coordination 
with Isaaq herders to settle grievances about access to Ethiopian pasture or revive 
Barre’s irredentist dream.  Mengistu also interfered in SMN’s internal affairs, and had 
early leaders arrested to hinder the SNM’s utility as a vehicle for personal ambitions 
of political entrepreneurs.
 70 
Thus by the time Mengistu forced the SNM to return to Somalia in 1988, the 
group could not easily finance itself through predation because it never could develop 
its own source of funding, ether from a generous patron or through looting local 
communities.  Ultimately it had to raise funds through deals with commercial 
intermediaries within the abban system constructed outside of Barre’s control.  Dahab 
Shiil, later one of Somaliland’s largest financial and telecom companies, got its start 
as an SNM financier.  Isaaq financiers based in the Ethiopian town of Dire Dawa 
intervened in the organization’s affairs as they used SNM’s radios to transfer money 
to fighters.
71  This alliance enabled the SNM to tap into migrants’ remittances to 
finance armed struggle, but not in ways that made business enterprises an adjunct to 
their own organization.  This arrangement made less likely the southern outcome 
where militia leaders also were the principal business operators in their region.  For 
their part the private commercial partners in these transactions used this alliance to 
consolidate their market leadership in telecoms and financial services in the 1990s, the 
two services that the remittance system integrates. 
This relationship continued to influence the organization of the SNM when its 
Ethiopian patrons force it to return to Hargeisa in 1988.  While Barre assigned 
strongmen that he supported in his patronage network the task of attacking Isaaq 
communities, they were free to support themselves with loot.  SNM fighters, on the 
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other hand, could not loot local communities that provided critical income from 
remittances and which were the bases of the commercial organizations essential to the 
militia’s continued survival.  Likewise, this lack of local leverage for armed groups 
undermined prospects for political entrepreneurs in the organization who entertained 
notions of joining the fray further south to fight their way to power.  Their initial 
dependence on businessmen who were outside Barre’s old networks meant that these 
men were not as free to loot their home communities as their southern colleagues 
were doing to pursue ambitions in the wider world of Mogadishu and the periodic 
foreign-sponsored peace conferences that gave seats to those whose predations made 
them difficult to ignore. 
This did not mean that the north was entirely free of predation.  Brig. Gen. 
Omar Jess, the Ogadeeni commander of the refugee militia after the 1978 war, then 
commander of a militia in the south, used his position in Barre’s patronage network to 
loot.  As his patron’s fortunes declined, Jess pursued his own ambitions, but this did 
not require that he shift his strategy for getting resources since he already had built his 
own commercial networks by virtue of his privileged ties to the president.  By the 
time Barre perceived that Jess was becoming a powerful figure in his won right in the 
1988 attack on Hargeisa and the SNM, Jess controlled enough resources to defy 
Barre’s order to leave his military post.  An analyst observed that Jess’ strength 
‘comes from having some 8,000 troops, nearly all Ogadeeni, under his direct 
command’.
72  Clan identity played a major role in this conflict.  More important, 
however, was Jess’ ability to sustain his organization through predation, since he did 
not derive his main income as a consequence of his on-going relationship with 
powerful members of a particular community.  This was a ‘strength’ gained by virtue 
of his position in a crumbling centralized patronage network and its violent 
appropriation of clandestine economies and state assets, not through some customary 
standing as head of a clan. 
 
Controlling Political Entrepreneurs  
Political entrepreneurs still posed a danger to the formation of a separate 
Somaliland polity outside the predatory framework of the collapse of Barre’s 
patronage networks.  For example, in June 1989 Jess formed his own Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM), which joined forces with the SNM that he previously attacked to 
overthrow Barre’s regime.  As Barre began to look very vulnerable, military leaders 
from the Hawiye clan, including Mohamed Farah Aydeed, organized their own clan-
based opposition groups under their personal leadership in the loosely organized 
United Somali Congress (USC) in nominal alliance with the SNM.  It was these 
military formations that Jess and Aydeed used to move south to the farming valleys to 
seize plantations that served as their own refuge for armed followers and to some 
extent a source of income that they controlled directly. 
But Jess’s SPM alliance and the other groups’ support for the SNM could not 
be described as a nationalist opposition to Barre.  These loose affiliations and shifting 
alliances are better explained in terms of the political entrepreneurial and social 
contexts of faction leaders.  Before his fall in 1991, Barre was able to instigate 
tensions between Hawiye sub-clans to create antagonisms between Hawiyes who had 
joined the SNM and its Isaaq core.  This led to a split in 1989, with the departure of 
Ali Mahamed Osooble Wardhigley, who organized a faction of the USC in Rome in 
Jan 1989.  The Hawiye dispute reinforced the mutual interests of other political 
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entrepreneurs in SNM and Barre himself in indirect ways.  For example, Ahmed 
Silanyo, the SNM chairman from 1984 to 1990, used an alliance with Hawiye 
commanders to cleanse the organization of fellow Isaaq who opposed him, behavior 
that contributed to Barre’s hold on power at first, but also encouraged ambitious 
strongmen to make their own bids for power.  Especially among the Hawiye factions 
of the USC, commanders conscripted fighters from various linage segments, and led 
them to Mogadishu to overthrow Barre.  This geographic mobility of fighters aided 
control of militia leaders, since it freed their fighters from immediate concerns about 
retaliation against their families for looting and murders that they committed.  These 
conflicts also seem to fit well with standard explanations that identify the extreme 
economic externalization and dependence on predatory rent-seeking opportunities as 
foreclosing any large-scale social control over violence.   
Nor were northern politicians immune to the allures of competition over the 
spoils of predation.  Abdirahmaan Ali Tuur, an Isaaq and the first (interim) president 
of Somaliland, joined the SNM shortly after its founding in 1981.  Tuur’s supporters 
were involved in fighting in the northern port city of Berbera in February 1992 where 
they emptied local banks and sacked several NGOs.  Conflicts over the integration of 
clan-based units into a Somaliland national army led to further fighting in 1991-92 
before clan elders brokered a peace agreement.  They criticized Tuur for his close 
friendship with Aydeed, and for his participation in various peace conferences 
organized by the UN and Egyptians.  Tuur was able to claim a seat at the negotiating 
table on the basis of his importance as a commander of fighters, which gave him 
additional incentives to battle potential allies and loot local communities, lest he be 
left out of any externally brokered settlement that promised control over the whole 
state—including clandestine and predatory economic opportunities—to the fortunate 
winners of the mediation effort.  Tuur’s maneuver also informed local notables’ 
criticisms of foreign-organized peace conferences in general.  They threaten internal 
stability through diluting local control over the control of resources since they raise 
the stakes of struggle to control the state.  This is not a situation easily dealt with in 
customary law, especially when the locus of that struggle is distant from the social 
context of customary law’s social control over violence.      
In the provisional government that followed, Tuur’s political authority rested 
upon his direct control over armed units.  The majority of the remaining militia 
commanders were dependent upon local clan elders for recruitment and to maintain 
loyalty within the ranks since their inability to establish ‘liberated zones’ in Ethiopian 
refuges (before their eviction in 1988 after incessant Ethiopian manipulation of 
leadership politics) led them to turn to Isaaq clan elders to recruit and maintain 
fighters.  Tuur’s fighters, on the other hand, found it easier to loot and abuse the local 
population, since they could escape social consequences of their behavior.  While in 
Somaliland, Tuur relied upon ties with Mohamed Aydeed for resources and to support 
him in conflicts with rivals within the SNM in Somaliland.  But when local 
commanders were able to control fighters enough to consolidate forces to oppose him, 
Tuur’s ambition took him from Somaliland to Mogadishu where he too contended for 
a role in externally supported peace negotiations.  Meanwhile, his associate Jaama 
Mahamed Ghalib Yare defeated in May 1993 presidential elections, helped promote 
fighting in Burao and Hargeisa in 1994-95, reportedly with the help of bribes, 
variously reported to be from Aydeed and other southern politicians who resisted 
Somaliland separatism.
73 
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As the experience of the war shows, northerners should have been even more 
susceptible to Barre’s strategy of divide-and-rule than their more privileged and 
better-connected southern neighbors.  They were the ones who faced the most vicious 
initial attacks, bereft of the resources that their southern rivals controlled by virtue of 
their ties to the old president.  In fact, political disfavour and the marginality to 
clandestine economic opportunities turned out to offer organizational means to 
northern authorities to resist outside interference once conflict started.  Marginality 
began to get translated into autonomous economic channels even before Barre’s rise 
to power.  Then exclusion from the benefits of southern agricultural projects, lack of 
access to subsidized credit, the fruits of privatization or the benefits of franco valuta 
manipulation in the 1980s forced more northerners abroad in search of work to 
support themselves and their families.  Overseas work attracted youth from all over 
Somalia, but by 1987, the majority of the estimated 375,000 migrants in Gulf States 
were northerners.
74  The International Labor Organization estimated n 1985 that 
165,000 to 200,000 Somalis lived in the Middle East and remitted approximately 30 
percent of their $700 million annual earnings, resources that contributed to northern 
elite autonomy and dependence upon local community business structures, rather than 
to predation. 
Evidence elsewhere suggests that autonomous local social control of 
clandestine sources of wealth in the context of state collapse helps preserve order.  
Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters had a fearsome reputation 
for committing serious human rights violations against non-combatants and devotion 
to diamond mining during the 1991-2002 war.  In 1994, Dr. Alpha Lavalie, a 
professor at the University of Sierra Leone, organized home guard units called 
Kamajors to defend communities in diamond mining areas.  While a student, Lavallie 
saw how Sierra Leone’s authoritarian ruler instigated violence in home town to divide 
opponents in an election, in which the regime ‘condoned, perhaps even encouraged, 
chiefdom uprisings which entailed intimidation and coercion’ with the help of thugs 
and paramilitaries acting on behalf of the president,
75 much as Barre manipulated clan 
affinities with help from strongmen and their paramilitaries in Somalia.  Lavallie 
observed, however, armed youths under the command of customary initiation society 
leaders tended to resist these enticements.  He noted that many of the young men 
joined the militias of politicians to loot communities and beat up the president’s critics 
were outsiders, usually unemployed youth from urban areas.  Local elders were able 
to use ‘traditional’ initiation rites to attract local youth and to drive out attackers.  
These youth became reliable defenders of their home communities and refused 
entreaties to join rebels to loot.
76  Yet Kamajor units outside their home areas drew 
criticism for looting and human rights abuses.
77  Kamajors eventually were organized 
as Civil Defense Forces (CDFs) as an alternative to the country’s fractured and 
predatory army.  Still, CDF-Kamajors stationed outside home areas have proven less 
effective fighters and more likely to shift alliances in local factional fighting much 
like predatory RUF units did. 
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The behaviour of young fighters in Somalia’s north reflected similar elements 
of local versus outsider control over the distribution of resources.  At first glance it 
appeared that Northerners had to cope with the problem of self-interested armed 
young men on the prowl for loot.  Gerard Prunier described his visit to Somaliland in 
1989: ‘The danger while traveling, comes rather from the SNM “auxiliaries,” armed 
youngsters who drift around pretending to be “Mujahiddins” but without being really 
attached to any regiment’.
78  But Prunier also observed that these young men mostly 
limited their predations to looting aid shipments.  Social control extended to fighters 
of the SNM.  He notes ‘the difficulty of shooting young apprentice-shiftas because 
their clan and family backgrounds have to be taken into account, and the same holds 
for any person they might kill,’
79 much like Sierra Leone’s Kamajors when they are 
posted in their home areas. 
 
Marginality and a New Somaliland Identity  
This work to this point shows the importance of differences in the social 
control of violence for explaining divergent political outcomes in northern and 
southern Somalia.  The most important difference has been in the relationship of local 
elites to economies, whether clandestine, patronage based or international.  Where 
they have been tied to a centralized patronage network their armed groups turn into 
predatory gangs, as when Col. Omar Jess used Ogadeeni refugees to battle regime 
enemies in the north, then took them to the south to conquer agricultural lands.  
Politically marginal elites, on the other hand, find more incentives to organize armed 
groups as autonomous protective organizations.  These elites also preserve and extend 
their power to settle disputes, give guarantees, enforce contracts, and ultimately tax 
those who they protect.  In all instances, leaders of militias and local strongmen may 
look and speak alike and may feel very strongly about obligations to serve the 
interests of kin.  Their differences derive from distinctive styles for managing the 
same resource: organized violence. 
Somaliland, and to a lesser extent the autonomous Majerteen-dominated far 
northeastern autonomous region of Puntland provide vantage points from which to 
view the relevance of this difference for contemporary political organization in 
peripheral areas of the world economy.  This internal process of controlling violence 
shows that the violent dissolution of political networks in collapsed states into 
‘network wars’ is not inevitable.  The contemporary world economy still permits local 
experimentation in forms bearing some resemblance to classic accounts of the 
formation of states as a consequence of reciprocal relations between ‘predators’ and 
‘victims’ in which the former gains some interest in the security and productivity of 
the latter, albeit in a global economy that weighs much more heavily on this internal 
process.  Internal institutional structures and norms, including informal ones, still 
influence how violence is distributed and controlled, and what types of organizations 
serve the interests of ambitious people.  This in turn affects the efficiency and 
organization of economic exchange in a process that permits a diversity of outcomes, 
including broader social control over the exercise of coercion.  This focus also 
highlights how wielders of force participate in the economy and conversely, how 
economic exchange affects those who manage force.
80 
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The self-declared Republic of Somaliland (and the Puntland State of Somalia), 
however, does not receive global recognition as distinct political communities.  This 
reluctance of the international community to extend formal recognition of sovereignty 
is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, entrepreneurs in those places face 
difficulties obtaining access to international institutions and norms that regulate 
economic opportunities.  For example, foreign businessmen complain that they cannot 
convince foreign insurance companies to write policies to indemnify their operations 
and protect assets.
81  Their mutual problem lies in their inabilities to find suitable 
venues for arbitration of disputes, a precondition for any contract to be recognized by 
an underwriter, much less to attract investors.  Nor will foreign investors agree to 
allow local authorities to adjudicate disputes out of fear that they will be biased in 
favour of fellow Somalis.  In normal course, business partners from different 
jurisdictions chose a neutral venue and agree to a third party that all trust to adjudicate 
disputes.   
Thus the absence of international recognition, observes an official of the 
Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, ‘means we cannot enter into formal trade 
agreements; we cannot even contact the outside world through direct postal services, 
as we are not a member of the postal union’.
82  The fact that Somaliland is not a de 
jure recognized state—in fact no state officially recognized Somaliland as of late 
2002, eleven years after its declaration of statehood—denies it and its business partner 
recourse to global basic commercial law infrastructure such as the 1958 Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards.  This convention 
provides the legal framework for transactions involving international agencies such as 
the World Bank.  Most multilateral trade protection and regulation agreements, such 
as those protecting intellectual property rights and foreign investment insurance 
require contracts to conform to the principles of the 1958 Convention.    
Somaliland remains outside this framework so long as international 
commercial law institutions have no mechanism for decertifying prewar ‘Somalia’.  It 
is unlikely that the latter will be decertified so long as international organizations 
continue to support the effort to extend the authority of the Transitional National 
Government in Mogadishu.  Global norms noted earlier against recognizing new 
states continue to inhibit consideration of this possibility.  Thus Somali and foreign 
businessmen complain that conventional international venues for adjudicating 
commercial disputes such as the American Association of Arbiters, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, and the World 
Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes have become 
progressively less able to provide services for business transactions that involve 
partners based in non-recognized entities and jurisdictions.  They complain that the 
growing prevalence of Anglo-Saxon common law as the standard framework for 
hearing international business disputes further limits their access to international 
commercial institutions.  Outside Somalia, most parties prefer this legal norm.  They 
appreciate its flexibility for dealing with novel and unanticipated legal and 
commercial situations, an advantage lacking in the legal codes of continental Europe 
that are more specific to countries’ situations and political priorities.  Litigants also 
cite preferences for US legal culture and practitioners.  Unlike most European jurists, 
typically considered auxiliaries of justice systems that prize a general interest and 
distance from clients.  US litigators, however, have no hesitation in demonstrating 
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legal inventiveness and tactical aggression, which clients take as evidence of the 
lawyer’s devotion to their client.
83  This complaint finds substance in decisions of US 
District Courts to deny standing to litigants who base claims on laws of entities whose 
sovereignty is not recognized by the US Government,
84 a hindrance that applies 
throughout the world of Anglo-Saxon legal practice which relies in large measure 
upon US commercial law precedence. 
How do those who do business in Somaliland organize their transactions?  
Large foreign firms can make agreements with Somaliland authorities, but they must 
try to avoid conflict with earlier agreements signed by the legal government of 
Somalia (from an international view) in Mogadishu.  Thus the European oil company 
TotalFinaElf supplies fuel to airports in Hargeisa and Berbera after ensuring that the 
pre-1991 Mogadishu government had made no contract with other firms to supply 
these services.  On the same principle in 2001, TotalFinaElf signed a one-year 
agreement with the Mogadishu TNG to explore for oil in the southern region of the 
Lower Shabelle and Jubba Valleys.
85  The TNG had legal competence to abrogate 
previous concession agreements and acknowledge old partner firms’ declarations of 
force majeure from the start of the war.  Despite their greater de facto authority, 
Somaliland authorities did not have this de jure capability.  Consequently, they have 
had to rely upon exploration agreements with less established firms that are willing to 
take the risk of doing business with a partner that might expose them to legal action in 
foreign courts from Agip, Amoco, Conoco, Phillips and Chevron, all of which held 
prewar concessions in the north.  Chinese firms have played a dominant role in these 
agreements, as they have in Sudan, where they have replaced western firms that have 
left under pressure from international sanctions against the Khartoum regime.
86  In 
this case, the Chinese government provides diplomatic and business support for these 
firms, helping them fill these niches that international commercial law renders out of 
bounds for most other firms.  This leaves Somaliland authorities in a bind.  They seek 
global recognition, and have declared that they will continue to honour existing 
contracts that foreign companies signed with the Barre regime.  Since recognition has 
not been forthcoming, authorities are willing to risk dealing with rogue firms.  But 
they must weigh this against the cost shifting partners and settling conflicting claims 
if others provide diplomatic recognition.  One official observed the difficulties this 
contradiction created for his government.  So long as western oil exploration firms are 
more competitive, Chinese authorities have a vested interest in frustrating 
Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, lest Chinese firms lose their protected 
niche.
87 
The consequence is that the majority of cross border transactions and foreign 
investments in Somaliland are most easily conducted through personal networks.  
This is where the defensive measures that local strongmen, clan elders, and members 
of the diaspora developed during the Barre regime become valuable tools for 
organizing Somaliland’s relations with the global economy while promoting 
Somaliland’s stability, a crucial task in sustaining the region’s self-determination 
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project.  While the legal infrastructure of international commerce keeps larger firms at 
bay, small Somali entrepreneurs with family ties to the region are able to use practices 
such as abban and other clan-based customs to guarantee contracts and protect 
transactions from risk.  This also means that Somali entrepreneurs run nearly all 
businesses in Somaliland and most have significant connections to the diaspora 
community and its capital.  
This social complexion of commerce gives local authorities a stake in 
protecting entrepreneurs, most of whom have family ties in the region.  Not only does 
this protect entrepreneurs from competition from larger foreign rivals, it binds the 
social control of violence that developed in the 1980s and 1990s to the protection of a 
local business class and the collection of revenues.  Adjudication of business disputes 
and protection of contracts is an extension of the negotiation process that local 
authorities were able to impose on militia leaders from the late 1980s to the present.  
This also gives local authorities the means to keep out entrepreneurs who they 
determine might disrupt local order.  Their denial of protection keeps resources out of 
the hands of political entrepreneurs who might otherwise use their wealth to raise a 
militia to contend for power in Mogadishu or make themselves powerful enough that 
foreign peace brokers will have to include them in negotiations.  This arrangement 
also explains why members of Somaliland’s diaspora do not become financiers of 
armed groups the way they do in the south where legitimate local authorities do not 
exercise social control over connections between wealth and coercion.  Local 
authorities’ control over the Security Forces of Somaliland, a 7,000-man army of paid 
soldiers financed through an official budget, along with informal control over 
customary adjudication ensures that those who lack protection will not fare well. 
Mogadishu provides a good contrast of commerce that is not regulated through 
these informal institutions.  Militias began to proliferate again in 2001-2002 as the 
TNG appeared to pose a more credible threat of imposing order on local strongmen.  
UN investigators reported that ‘some leading businessmen have outflanked militia 
leaders from their own clans and have started buying the backing of individual militia 
fighters’.
88  This they attributed to ‘part of the competition between Somali groups in 
advance of the anticipated conference of concerned parties in Nairobi under the 
auspices of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) peace 
negotiations’.
89  This commercial independence also enables entrepreneurs to use 
militias to improve their economic fortunes.  An attack on the home of the TNG’s 
Interior Minister in March 2002 and again in May appeared to stem from a dispute 
concerning the minister’s business operations in the Middle Shabelle Region where he 
controlled farms.
90  Likewise, splits within the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), a 
southern-based militia, show a similar connection between business, political 
fragmentation and disorder.  After declaring a ‘South-Western Regional State of 
Somalia’ in April 2002, fighting broke out in July between an RRA commander—a 
former Barre-era National Security Service Commander—and his deputies over the 
right to tax trucks passing through Baidoa.  Since elders exercise little leverage over 
militia members who have come from other parts of Somalia it is the entrepreneurs 
who determine how coercion is used, not local customary authorities. 
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Somaliland businesses still encounter trouble with organizing transactions 
with non-Somali enterprises.  Thus businesses that actually conduct operations in 
Somaliland and Puntland use off-shore ‘home offices’ in the globally recognized 
jurisdictions of Djibouti, and increasingly in more reliable and internationally 
connected venues in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), much as the business 
associates of the SNM in the late 1980s, and local entrepreneurs throughout the Barre 
era ‘borrowed’ their Ethiopian and Djibouti neighbours’ sovereignty to avoid 
predators within Somalia.  During Barre’s time this was a defensive measure.  Now, 
these ties, reinforced through diaspora connections, are deployed to seek out new 
economic opportunities, a demonstration of the transformation and reinforcement of 
an old ad hoc practice put to the service of a new task.  For example, Somaliland’s 
largest of three airlines, Daallo Airline, is based in Djibouti ‘to ensure neutrality, 
flexibility and independence.’  An official in the firm also notes that this arrangement 
enables underwriters to write policies to insure the company’s aircraft.  Daallo’s 
venue also is critical for managing inter-airline agreements with foreign carriers, for 
gaining access to the Gabriel, Galileo and Amadeus global reservation systems, and 
organizing financial services to collect fares via electronic payments and internet-
based systems, all of which require mutually agreeable venues for resolving possible 
commercial problems.
91 
The advent of the internet mitigates some of these difficulties, since this 
allows firms to conduct immediate transactions in ‘cyber-space’.
92  In practical terms, 
this allows firms access to the laws and norms of the geographic space in which a 
server is located and enables the business entrepreneur to shop for the institutional 
benefits of different venues.  For initial transactions, at least, the ability of a firm to 
remain connected to customers and services reassures both groups of partners that the 
firm is integrated into globally recognized norms and procedures.  These technical 
advances favour financial intermediaries such as Dahab Shiil, which was noted above 
for playing an important role in facilitating the finances of the SNM.  This firm, for 
example, formed a telecom subsidiary in Burao, Somtel, to handle directly the 
growing business in private remittances from migrants.  Somtel has also helped 
address the Chamber of Commerce’s complaint about an absence of a postal union 
agreement though simply organizing a private postal system via an agreement with 
Ethiopia’s state post office.  With 1,000 workers, Somtel claims to be Somaliland’s 
largest private employer.  Other financial and telecom firms play important roles in 
organizing a central bank.  President Egal (who died on 3 May 2002 and was replaced 
by Dahir Riyale Kahin) admitted that his regime’s currency reserves reside in the 
State Bank of Ethiopia, and that the instant communications of Somaliland’s efficient 
telecom and financial services make this unusual arrangement feasible.
93 
Somaliland’s government gains a political advantage of reliance on business 
intermediaries that can remain offshore at arms length.  Though it is reliant on these 
businesses for revenue, authorities also are forced to take into account business 
interests in promoting economically efficient policies and in limiting commercial risk 
within Somaliland.  Thus unlike southern political actors, Somaliland’s authorities 
have an immediate interest in imposing uniform order and controlling coercion.  
These interests complicate any effort of political figures to subordinate business to a 
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patronage network in Barre’s fashion.  Somaliland thus emerges as a remarkable 
exception for appearing to have solved this serious obstacle to building effective and 
legitimate polities in the African context.  Furthermore, it has done so through 
adapting to an unconventional international status, and more generally, as a response 
to marginality that in the eyes of many scholars ought to have condemned this 
community to violence and fragmentation.  This relationship of commerce, customary 
authority and government represents a hybrid ‘re-traditionalization’ of power in that it 
recovers some of the flexibility of customary authority figures and practices to 
adjudicate disputes and distribute resources, much like the role of xeer in guaranteeing 
contracts in pre-colonial Somalia described earlier in this work.  Only now, this social 
process takes account of a broader global context in which this flexibility becomes 
advantageous. 
Likewise, Somaliland’s diaspora from among its two million inhabitants and 
their remittances force local authorities to adapt flexible methods to get access to their 
resources, while also limiting the power of these authorities.  While it is difficult to 
determine what portion are northerners, Somali migration since the start of internal 
conflicts in the early 1980s has been considerable (see table).  Unlike southerners, 
northern migrants had the advantage of arriving at already established ‘beachhead’ 
groups overseas that 
 
Table: Overseas Somalis (2000) 
 
Canada  30,000     Denmark  14,000 
 USA    25,000      Sweden    12,000 
Netherlands  25,000     Germany  8,400 
UAE    25,000     Switzerland  5,400 
Saudi Arabia  20,000     Finland    5,300 
Britain   20,000     Norway    4,000 
Italy    20,000     Australia  2,000 
 
(source: M-A. Pérouse de Montclos, ‘A Refugee Diaspora: When the Somali  
Goes West’, Khalid Koser, ed., New African Diasporas, (London: Routledge,  
2002.) 
 
consolidated and benefited from kinship connections through abbans and reverse 
migration, as well as the negative feature of having been specifically targeted for 
collective punishment prior to the spread of general conflict after 1990.
94 
  Overall remittances are difficult to quantify.  Net estimates for all of Somalia 
range from $140 million to $800 million annually.
 95  This overshadows the $115 
million in donor assistance to all of Somalia in 2000, of which 42 percent went to 
Somaliland and Puntland.
96  A private analyst ventures an estimate of $150 million 
annually for Somaliland.
97  Somaliland’s Ministry of Planning provides a more 
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precise estimate of $97 million for remittances in 1997.
98  Regardless of the precise 
figure, all of these estimates overshadow government budgets, which in 1999 stood at 
$26 million to provide for 6,000 civil employees.
99  Remittances also compete with 
local returns from the export of livestock, which amounted to about $125 million in 
2000.  Saudi claims of detection of Rift Valley Fever in Somali cattle, coupled with 
their subsequent ban on Somali cattle imports, prompted a collapse of this source of 
income and increased local reliance on remittances from overseas. This is also thought 
to have increased the influence of clan elders who pressure overseas communities to 
send money home.
100   This income has a substantial impact on local consumption, 
especially in Hargeisa where remittances are estimated to constitute about 40 percent 
of household income.
101 
  Somaliland’s diaspora community stands at arms length from the Somaliland 
government, yet is critical to the viability of a separate Somaliland polity.  This 
relationship, along with the paucity of foreign aid, ensures that resources do not 
become concentrated in the hands of a single faction, nor in the dispersion and 
channels of resources do they present an easy target for predatory political 
entrepreneurs.  This conclusion contradicts findings of the World Bank’s development 
research director, who states that ‘if a country which has recently ended a conflict has 
a large diaspora living in the USA, its risk that the conflict will resume is sharply 
increased’.
102  This conclusion reflects the analysis that diasporas are more susceptible 
to extremist appeals and separatist romanticism because they do not suffer the 
consequences of subsequent violence.  Thus they offer a source of easy revenues to 
political entrepreneurs.  In fact, Somalia and Somaliland show that, like arguments 
linking natural resources with predation, this argument misses the variable nature of 
the underlying political economy of informal and clandestine economies—the main 
focus of this study—that are responsible for the different organizational outcomes of 
conflict. 
 Overall, marginality actually may promote order in Somaliland.  This is not 
the marginality that preserves pristine local customs, as in the imagination of British 
colonial officers.  Instead it promotes innovation.  That Somaliland does not possess 
global recognition of its sovereignty, nor receives much foreign aid, forces its 
government to make deals with powerful groups, especially elders, who hold the key 
of access to overseas resources.  Since local firms are forced to locate offices in places 
like Djibouti and the UAE where they are able to get access to underwriter’s services, 
arbitration acceptable to foreign business partners, and somewhat easier access to 
capital, Hargeisa officials have to rely upon the confidence of elders and families who 
have connections to diasporas to attract contractors willing to provide services and 
utilities and collect revenues.  Some interpret this as a de-regulatory, free market 
success story.
 103  It is more accurate to describe it as a success of institutionalizing a 
‘clandestine’ economy under the social control of clan elders to create order and fend 
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off political entrepreneurs who would otherwise have incentives to prey upon local 
communities.  This ability to constitute a separate political order in territory they 
control in the midst of a marginal external and violent regional political economy is 
critical to Somaliland authorities’ pursuit of self-determination. 
Somaliland’s persistent lack of global diplomatic recognition remains 
problematic, however.  Somaliland officials fit their political community within the 
confines of the former British Somaliland in the hopes that foreigners will recognize 
their state as they did Eritrea, as a final act of de-colonization to fulfill the post-
colonial norm that each separate colony is entitled to recognition as an independent 
state.   In terms of international law, Somaliland’s case is stronger, for example, than 
that for Bosnia.
104  Unlike Eritrea, however, Somaliland’s army did not capture the 
capital of the state from which it separated, nor did it secure an agreement from its old 
capital separation.  More important, continued international efforts to mediate 
Somalia’s conflict do not accept the principle of partition as a solution to conflict.  
Thus Somaliland self-determination is constrained by these persistent international 
norms. 
Taiwan provides a useful parallel.  A distant and locally illegitimate capital 
claims Taiwan as its’ own.  Much of the rest of the world recognizes this claim.  
Nonetheless, Taiwan’s business families straddle international borders, using bases in 
Vancouver, Hong Kong and Singapore to provide services that require full-scale de 
jure sovereignty.  Like Taiwan, Somaliland authorities for their part conduct what 
looks like diplomacy masquerading as business in conjunction with a huge 
commercial diaspora.  Whether it is recognized or not, the end result is that 
Somaliland’s authorities have succeeded in asserting self-determination through state-
like strategies of gaining control over the exercise of violence and negotiating with 
productive groups in society for support and revenues to increase the capacity and 
legitimacy of the political organization.  In this regard Somaliland is more state-like in 
a classical de facto sense than are the majority of de jure sovereign states in Africa. 
 
Puntland Self-Determination in Comparison 
Somaliland’s neighbour on the northeast corner of Somalia styles itself as The 
Puntland State of Somalia to stress that its leaders explicitly reject calls for 
recognition as a separate state.
105  Puntland, however, also illustrates the centrality of 
the political economy of conflict to the establishment of new political communities.  
This is the region that earlier produced the anti-Barre SSDF militia, which provided 
an organizational basis and personnel for the Puntland administration.  Puntland’s 
administration also got a later start, organizing in 1997-98 partly as a result of 
discussions between SSDF leaders and regional elders under the auspices of the 
Uppsala (Sweden) Life and Peace Institute and the UNRISD War-torn Societies 
Project to identify ways of creating security forces, and instituting reliable means to 
control and pay them.
106  The former SSDF leader Abdulahi Yusuf emerged as the 
head of the Puntland administration in this externally assisted process.  Puntland’s 
formation also shows that external mediation is not always an incitement to violence 
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and disruptive of local order.  The UNRISD project operated with an explicit 
conceptual recognition that the quelling of violence required binding authorities to the 
interests of elders through denying authorities an autonomous source of income or 
capacity to exercise violence. 
Puntland’s relative order has helped promote the same kinds of business 
operations seen in Somaliland.  Firms such as one providing water to the town of 
Bossasso use offshore offices to conduct relations with suppliers.  Their lease contract 
with the municipality relies upon paper contracts and ‘common understanding’ with 
local authorities that clan elders help mediate contract disputes, protect assets and 
collect fees.  These intermediaries also help the firm manage political pressure from 
local authorities not to increase prices and to provide services to government 
installations for free.  Entrepreneur perceptions that Puntland remains at risk of 
violence limits investment in water utilities.  Unlike electricity generation that can 
involve a removable generator, underground pipes are not easily evacuated if the 
region returns to war.  Thus this entrepreneur reports a great willingness to conclude 
long-term agreements with local authorities to manage risk, a discussion that includes 
reference to clan elders as credible mediators and guarantors in lieu of reliable 
government courts or enforceable contract law.  This also means that sensible 
entrepreneurs include representation from a wide range of local clans in management 
positions and form business alliances according to the same strategic calculus, 
reflecting the relative weakness and late formation of credible clan elder oversight of 
Puntland authorities compared to Somaliland.
107 
Puntland has more uncertain claims to sovereign status compared to 
Somaliland, a factor that contributes to complicating the development of sustainable 
clan elder-business-government arrangements.  Ironically this is due less to the 
absence of global recognition of sovereignty, a condition shared with Somaliland, as 
to the internal ambiguity as to appropriate physical boundaries of the community.  
Puntland never enjoyed a distinct legal identity in international law, unlike 
Somaliland’s colonial experience as a separate administration from the south.  
Nonetheless, Puntland’s first president was able to build a militia of about 1,500 
fighters that succeeded in fending off interlopers from the southern region of which 
Puntland is still formally a constituent part.  Local entrepreneurs, officials and foreign 
NGOs have learned how to live with this effective division.  The main complaint of 
commercial agents remains, however, that local authorities face a more difficult task 
of deciding where the polity’s boundaries should lie, a dilemma that deters foreign 
partners, including among the Somali diaspora.  Especially where alliances require 
cross cutting clan participation, one can always argue that the next settlement, the next 
hill or the next kilometer of coast ought to be included.  This uncertainty leaves as 
ambiguous where the ultimate center of regional power lies or who has the right (or 
power) to stake a claim to leadership.  Thus local strongmen have played a dual game 
of seeking power in Puntland and, when the opportunity presents itself, as players in 
contention or negotiations centered on Mogadishu.  Fighting broke out in August 
2002 in this context between Col. Abdullah Yusuf’s militia (which allegedly received 
outside support from Ethiopia) and those opposed to his administration.  A claimant to 
the presidency, Jama Ali Jama subsequently fled to Libya.
108 
The existence of regional peace negotiations under the auspices of IGAD and 
separate negotiations organized by Ethiopia offer opportunities for political 
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entrepreneurs in Puntland to make a bid for influence in Somalia as a whole.  
Puntland’s council of elders removed Abdulahi Yusuf as the administration’s leader in 
2001 amidst allegations that he was trying to use his position as a platform to 
negotiate in Mogadishu.  Abdulahi Yusuf raised a militia in his hometown, and at the 
end of 2001 a council-sponsored mediation effort only was able to postpone this 
conflict.  Abdulahi Yusuf was able to appropriate customs revenues from his home 
base of Boosaaso, Puntland’s source of about 80 percent of administrative revenues.  
He was able to use these resources outside the framework of the local council that 
tried to mediate the conflict, much as Ethiopian aid gave him the flexibility to chart 
his own military strategy. 
So far self-determination has relied upon finding diplomatic cover that can 
compensate for some of the shortcomings in Puntland authorities’ control over 
coercion.  A key strategy involves fashioning local authority as a ‘civil society’ 
development organization rather than as a state.  This strategy has the virtue of 
attracting outside resources in the form of foreign aid.  Foreign donors do not have to 
worry that their assistance will imply recognition of Puntland as a separate state.  The 
authority addressed this problem by contracting in March 1999 with a newly formed 
local private firm, the Puntland International Development Corporation (PIDC), to run 
a police force and coast guard.
109  Police and coast guard recruits (trained by private 
British military service experts) were drawn from among the young men who served 
in militias.  To address sensitivities of local sub-clans, young men were stationed in 
their own communities.  The private corporate nature of the police force was designed 
to address community concerns about the misappropriation of revenues to run these 
security forces.  If styled as a ‘private’ operation that puts no revenues in the hands of 
administrators, there are no resources available to enterprising individuals outside the 
clan community framework, nor is the administration a target of predation.  Money 
and recruits remain under close scrutiny of community elders, both to ensure fiscal 
probity and proper behaviour by young men with guns.   
Furthermore, the creation of PDIC establishes an interlocutor that can attract 
aid from foreign charitable organizations and state-run programs geared toward 
security sector reform, since aid to PIDC does not establish diplomatic precedent 
regarding relations with Puntland authorities.  This vehicle also helps give local 
leaders more control over the distribution of resources from outsiders, limiting the 
multiplication of predatory factions such as during the 1980s when Barre’s regime 
used foreign aid to refugees as patronage, and local commanders commandeered 
refugee aid to support their own private armed groups.  PDIC also provides a portal 
for foreign resources for security sector issues that are harder for individual politicians 
to appropriate.  Foe example, de-mining efforts attract support from UNDP to assist 
the local Puntland Mine Action Centre.  This non-state global relationship allows 
UNDP authorities to overlook Somalia’s requirement to ratify the Ottawa Treaty 
regulating anti-personnel mines.  Since Puntland does not claim to be a state, UNDP 
requires only that ‘relevant authorities embrace the spirit of the Ottawa Treaty’ and 
function as a local NGO.
110 
Overall, Puntland resembles other ‘non-state’ authorities that have had no 
prior international status as separate sovereignties.  This category includes ‘non-
states’ such as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan), the Dnestr 
Moldovan Republic (in Moldova), the Republic of South Ossetia (in Georgia), the 
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Republic of Abkhazia (also in Georgia) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.   
Like Puntland, these separatist regions construct central governments, collect 
revenues and organize some services.  But in the Somalia context, Puntland does this 
less effectively, as do these other ‘non-states’ in their regional political economic 
contexts.  This is because central authorities find considerable incentives to exploit 
clandestine business opportunities for themselves rather than regulate and tax non-
governmental enterprises since their precarious status requires that they rely upon a 
regional state ‘patron’—in this case, Ethiopia—that can intervene to keep a particular 
local faction in power.
111   
 At best, if local councils of elders can become more solidly institutionalized, 
their closest relative in international society might be the UAE, which also functions 
much like a political arena in which several councils of elders of elders of different 
lineages settle disputes and agree to cooperate in common ventures, much as 
independent polities negotiate with one another.
112  Only in UAE’s case, local lineage 
elders managed to convince the rest of the world that their unusual arrangement be 
considered as a state, a major qualification for comparison with Puntland.  The 
inability of non-state actors to control political entrepreneurs’ access to resources 
continues to undermine the ability of any single authority to concentrate and control 
the exercise of coercion.  This is reflected in continued incidences of piracy off the 
Puntland coast.  Late in July 2002, for example, an oil tanker registered in North 




Self-Determination in the Shadow of Globalization? 
The analysis above makes clear that Somalia is not an ahistorical clan society.  
It shows how self-determination involves building polities that can impose order in a 
defined space through controlling the exercise of coercion and regulating transactions 
with outsiders.   It underscores that self-determination is not an endogenous process.  
Polities develop as results, some more intentional than others, of internal and external 
interactions.  This is not surprising.  Major scholars and historians of state formation 
in the West long have noted that states developed there through internal processes of 
bargaining between authorities and those who wield means of coercion on the one 
hand, and societal responses to pressures and opportunities in the wider world on the 
other hand.
114   This variability appears in Somalia’s past too.  Somalia’s north 
appeared as ‘stateless’ to I.M. Lewis quoted at the start of this work, as it did to 
Richard Burton in the 19
th century.  Yet it was also in the north that from the 10
th to 
the 15
th century was the site of small kingdoms under the Sultanate of Ifat.  A 16
th 
century sultanate included parts of the Upper Shabeelle River, Jubba River and Indian 
Ocean coasts that now are centres of disorder and conflict.
115 
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At the start of this work I highlighted four propositions that contribute to an 
explanation of this variation, and by extension the formation of new polities as 
vehicles for self-determination in the contemporary Somali space.  These propositions 
also provide a basis for drawing out broader implications for movements of self-
determination in the contemporary world, especially in the context of state failure, 
violence and economic marginality.  First, throughout Somalia unofficial and non-
state institutions have played key roles in building new authorities.  Inter and intra 
clan negotiating norms, clandestine markets, and informal political networks tied to 
Barre’s patrimonial strategy of rule all featured more centrally than did formal 
institutions of the Somali state, especially after collapse of the irredentist state-
building project in the late 1970s.   Barre and his cronies manipulated laws such as the 
franco valuta foreign exchange mechanism in the service of the informal institutions 
of patronage and clandestine deals that kept their political networks together.  
Likewise, international aid provided more resources for this social construction of 
violence and accumulation in the 1980s. 
The second proposition, however, provides a lens for distinguishing the 
variable impact of these informal networks for the destruction and reconstitution of 
authority and the control of coercion.  The variety of experiences in the Somali space 
shows that when formal and informal institutional frameworks favour old networks of 
elites with greater ties to local communities, the scope for intervention of disruptive 
political entrepreneurs is reduced.  The experience of Somaliland, and to a lesser 
extent Puntland shows how local clan elders and military strongmen had to rely upon 
their ties to local communities and a large diaspora population to weather the 
consequences of Barre’s suspicion and distrust of their intentions.  Even if these 
people wanted to be part of Barre’s privileged inner circle, they found that they faced 
greater hardship and fewer opportunities than did more favoured groups elsewhere in 
Somalia.  By extension, this shows how marginality in the earlier period of 
patrimonial politics gave incentives to local authorities to build defensive 
arrangements.  These later turned out to be social resources that gave clan elders the 
means to mediate conflict, control coercion and most importantly, regulate the social 
use of wealth to prevent enterprising strongmen from recruiting young men to loot 
local communities and rush to bargaining tables in distant cities to assert a claim to 
rule Somalia.   
A major implication of this observation is that activities that governments, 
international agencies, and activists define as fuel for conflict and appropriate targets 
for suppression—‘conflict diamonds’, smuggling rackets and the like—may play 
important roles in mitigating conflict and underwriting self-determination.  It is not 
the illegal or forbidden nature of the transactions that is most important in this 
analysis.  Instead, the social context of these transactions is what determines the local 
legitimacy of this activity.  Authorities in Somaliland succeed in substantial measure 
in the most basic task of governance, to ‘compel men equally to the performance of 
their covenants, by the terror of some punishment’
116 whether in the guarantee of 
commercial contracts in lieu of Somaliland’s access to conventional international 
commercial institutions, or to force local militias and armed young men to heed the 
broader interests of their communities.  The major policy implication for this 
observation is that wanton international suppression of ‘illicit’ or ‘wartime’ 
commerce, as when the US president directed in late 2001 that sanctions be applied 
against informal money transfer institutions that serve overseas Somalis who send 
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money home, can increase the risk of violence and undermine successful efforts at 
promoting order. 
Third, where elites who adopt old informal institutions—such as clandestine 
commerce in the case of Somaliland—face competition from new institutions and 
channels that offer resources, the risk of fragmentation is higher.  The cases above 
show how this proposition undermined order throughout Somalia during Barre’s 
regime.  The president attracted followers through offering resources that were 
autonomous of the social control of the communities from which these men hailed.  
Violence became generalized throughout Somalia by the late 1980s, even worse in the 
north than the south, but not all violence was the same.  Everywhere it was worse 
when predators with outside sources of income attacked.  The difference in the north 
was that legitimate local authorities, especially clan elders, could regulate sources of 
income for local strongmen and recruit them for fighting off interlopers.  Later events 
demonstrated the same principle.  Puntland’s Abdullahi Yusuf, for example, proved 
more willing to loot his own community and defy arbitration by Puntland’s elders 
when he could rely upon Ethiopian support.  Indeed, it appears that Ethiopian 
authorities recognize that sponsoring endless ‘peace conferences’ is a good way to 
keep Somalia fragmented to ensure it never poses an irredentist threat or that Somali 
groups develop effective ties to Ethiopia’s own Oromo separatists.  The broad policy 
implications for this finding are round-tables, conferences, NGO aid and other 
‘conflict prevention’ measures can intensify conflict and promote fragmentation if 
they are sought without consideration of the nature of local social control over 
resources and coercion.  UN-sponsored peace talks in Mogadishu, for example, attract 
militia leaders to the city, resulting in an increase in fighting that overwhelms the 
local mechanisms that elders have devised to control conflict.
117 
Finally, if local actors can meet the above conditions—regulate the flow of 
resources through all channels, including clandestine, control how those resources are 
used in order to mitigate freelance exercise of coercion, and do so free from the 
disruptive influence of outsiders bearing gifts and enticements that give enterprising 
freelancers other alternatives—they prove able to equip their societies to exploit 
opportunities in the international economy.  The world economy is not favourable to 
places like Somaliland or Puntland.  There is little that these places can sell to the rest 
of the world.  On the one hand they remain highly dependent upon diaspora 
remittances, and they are not attractive places for investment by people who do not 
share the cultural ties and understandings that are integral to the regulation (and 
success) of business there.  On the other hand, this condition may exempt local people 
from some of the more disruptive aspects of the world economy such as the sudden 
appearance of extremely efficient foreign enterprises that have more leverage to defy 
local interests and priorities.  Somalilanders may lament the poor state of their 
economy at present.  But strong ties between their diaspora and the informal 
regulatory power of local authorities seems to offer at least the possibility of 
following the paths of UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, and to some degree Lebanon, 
which are among the few examples of prosperity and successful integration into the 
world economy on the basis of transnational family and clan cultural networks rather 
than the centralizing administrative projects that scholars of early modern European 
state-building describe (and which World Bank and other officials increasingly 
prescribe). 
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Taken together, these propositions recognize that marginal status in the global 
economy can be integrated into movements for self-determination, in this case, 
Somaliland’s autonomy.  Seemingly ‘archaic’ and even (from an outsider’s view) 
illicit social forms and activities can play important roles in this political change.  
Thus Lewis’ ‘call of kinship’ is important for understanding the Somali space and the 
future of its constituent parts, but it is hardly immutable, nor is it opposed to self-
determination and state-building of a sort that is able to integrate into wider economic 
and political circuits. 
 
Somalia’s Lessons for Self-Determination Amidst Marginality 
Many other ‘marginal’ conflicts related to state collapse elsewhere in the 
world reinforce the lessons learned from the Somalia space.  Most dramatically, illicit 
trades, clandestine economies and armed strongmen can either be disruptive 
promoters of fragmentation or they can be elements of the constitution of a new order 
and possibilities for self-determination.  Olivier Roy explains, for example, how 
leaders of several Central Asian states integrate socialist communal farms and other 
enterprises into a single political community on the basis of their identities as ‘neo-
clans’ arising out of socialist era ties to an informal economy of favours and illicit 
exchanges.  In Tajikistan, on the other hand, this old elite and their clandestine ‘fixers’ 
faced competition from an outsider group, which give local level political 
entrepreneurs the chance to pick and chose among would-be protectors and allies 
inside Tajikistan and from among outside mediators as completing factions jockeyed 
for position in peace negotiations.
 118   
Likewise, the separatist ‘Dnester Moldovan Republic’, base of the Soviet 14
th 
Army, was a prime candidate for multiplying ethnic security dilemmas and predatory 
conflict.  Yet after fighting between 1991 and 1994, fighting ceased.  Closer 
examination reveals a ‘traditional’ Soviet army value system that survived within the 
14
th Army that dominates the region.  Ordinary Soviet soldiers long contended with an 
informal system of hazing and other physical abuse as they encountered the local 
pecking ordered of military units.  Families had to seek out individuals to bribe for 
special treatment for their sons, soldiers had to seek out protectors, while officers 
tolerated and even promoted the system as good for building unit solidarity and 
identifying ‘good guys’ and ‘team players’.  Mediation during the fighting in 1991 to 
1994 came from Aleksander Lebed, a ‘good guy’ who commanded respect in this 
informal institution as much as in the formal.  As an operator or politician or whatever 
one prefers to call him, he used social control over actual fighters to help local 
commanders maintain local solidarities through appeals to a shared ideal that prized 
the notion of Soviet internationalism.  Strengthening this solidarity undermined 
political entrepreneurs who tried to frame local conflicts in ethnic terms.  Had such 
entrepreneurs been more successful it is likely that the conflict would have become 
more violent.  Suddenly members of the same unit (who from a ‘traditional’ Soviet 
internationalist perspective were equally ‘at home’ anywhere in the Soviet space, 
whatever their parentage) would find themselves bearers of an ethnic label far from 
their respective homelands, and forced to seek alliances with other ethnic kinsmen.   
The Russian Ingush Republic’s (now former) President Ruslan Aushev, 
neighbour of war-torn Chechnya also demonstrates the variable uses of informal 
institutions and clandestine commerce.   He presided over the multiple mafias of his 
land-locked ‘offshore economic zone’.  Aushev legalized vendetta with police help to 
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regulate this trade, thus locking armed young men into an arrangement where they 
faced social constraints if they used violence against their own communities.  Aushev 
removed Arab ‘guests’ from the region, complaining that outsiders were issuing 
fatwas to encourage local youth to kidnap people and rob business for income to pay 
for the Holy struggle.  For Ingush people who encountered these young men as 
predatory bandits, and Aushev’s measures were popularly regarded as restoring social 
control over armed young men and instrumental in removing opportunities for violent 
entrepreneurs in the guise of Arab guests and Chechen provacateurs.   
Each of these places also face the overall framework for ‘self-determination’ 
that reflects how the international community wants to resolve conflicts.  What most 
of these people want is to ‘self-determine’ as a separate political community, not as a 
minority in someone else’s state.  The international community does not encourage 
these desires as people fear that ‘self-determination’ for the likes of Somaliland 
(unless Hargeisa authorities can convince outsiders that their project is a final act of 
decolonization as independence for British Somaliland) but especially Puntland and 
the rest will start a domino reaction as rebellious minorities resort to violence to press 
their claims for self-determination.  
 
The Meaning of Contemporary State Collapse for Self-Determination 
The relatively durable and stable political arrangements in Somaliland and 
Puntland shed light on the nature and possibilities of political organization in the 
context of state collapse.  Of particular interest to students of social movements is the 
decisions and capacities of some Somali leaders to resist incentives for short-term 
predation and interference from violent entrepreneurs.  This addresses the basic 
question of explaining why people cooperate to form political communities at all, 
especially when such behavior is irrational from a short-term materialist perspective.  
Do either self-interested or altruistic protectors, perhaps responding to hidden 
incentives, provide political order and define communities?  Or do communities 
prevail upon rulers to hold them accountable for their behavior, or even choose their 
rulers, binding them with a contract to respect certain rights and giving them 
incentives not to abuse citizens?
119   
The 21
st century and its global market is supposed to impose great constraints 
on states, at least on the world’s poorest states. ‘Everywhere, boundaries are being 
drawn between protected and prosperous global enclaves and the anarchic poverty-
stricken areas beyond’.  People at the margins of world diplomacy and commerce 
discover that state institutions and autarchic economic policies can no longer protect 
them.
120  They choose (or are forced into) a ‘Somali road to development’;
121 faction 
based politics centered on violent competition for resources that is incompatible with 
the existence of a centralized state or expression of a single political community 
beyond unstable ethnic mini-states and fragmented political affiliations of inhabitants.  
Manuel Castells conceptualized violent competition for resources among 
political actors and the disruption of broad-based political communities as ‘network 
                                                 
119 Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 
87:3, 567-76 presents a coercive explanation for imposition of political order.  Barry Weingast, ‘The 
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 91:2, 
245-63 offers a contractarian version, and Vadim Volkov, ‘The Political Economy of Protection 
Rackets in the Past and Present’, Social Research, 67:3, 1-36 offers a socially constructed alternative.  
120 Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), 75; Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, (London: Zed, 2001). 
121 Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis & Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1999), xiv. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS100   Page 43 
war’, a violent globalization as predatory entrepreneurs exploited their own 
communities and undermined local order, using instead privileged connections to 
global networks to protect them from the negative consequences of socially 
destructive behavior that states once regulated and suppressed.
122  This competition 
reflects the end of the viability of cold war era state-building projects based upon 
government support and protection for local industry and foreign investors.  Thus 
intense global economic competition hits weak states very hard.  After the cold war’s 
end, states like Somalia were even less able to compete in the global economy on the 
same basis as wealthy states.  Now they were left without diplomatic protection and 
foreign aid that earlier they used to compensate for their internal weaknesses and 
marginal position in the world economy.  More fortunate and wealthier individuals 
can integrate themselves into global networks, especially clandestine economic ones, 
without services of a protective state.  An economist summed up this potential for 
destruction with regard to Somalia as early as 1960: ‘If a country such as England, 
which is heavily dependent on foreign trade for its standard of living, were suddenly 
cut off from channels of international economic intercourse, it would doubtless be 
worse off as a result, but so would the rest of the world; whereas if Somalia were cut 
off from international trade, it would be worse off, but the rest of the world would 
not’.
123 
The structural irrelevance of poor countries to the world’s economy does not 
produce a void in place of cold war era economic relations, nor need it result in the 
total exclusion of people in the periphery of the global economic and political order.  
People in poor countries reintegrate themselves into the world economy on new terms.  
Castells expects them to exploit niches in the world economy, usually clandestine 
businesses such as drug trafficking, toxic waste dumping and frauds.  This is not 
supposed to generate viable alternatives to states, at least in terms of promoting 
widespread security and economic opportunity, since these networks rely upon violent 
exploitation of communities, armed attacks on competitors, and have few incentives 
to provide public goods.  These strategies increase inequality and conflict.  Equally 
important, they are supposed to be incompatible with maintaining territorial and 
bureaucratic states since authority and coercion are based on control over commercial 
networks which are used to manipulate social solidarities—clans, ethnic associations 
and the like—rather than to support expensive formal state bureaucracies, laws, and 
regulations that require broad popular legitimacy to finance and to sustain 
compliance.  This appears to be true in many instances, especially where competitors 
for power and those who challenge them pursue neither broad programmatic or 
ideological projects, nor do they mobilize followers in institutions like nationalist 
state-builders of the cold war era used.   
But marginality is not the same as withdrawal from global commerce.  
Expectations of the political economy of conflict often assumers that even those 
opposing predators become predators since access to guns requires deals with violent 
outsiders who can tolerate huge risks of violent state collapse and who benefit from 
the extreme deregulation that crumbling formal state structures leave in their wake.  
The growth of unregulated trades help political entrepreneurs provision followers 
through trades in small arms, petrol, stolen 4X4 vehicles and food.  Illicit trade in 
weapons, for example, feeds on the global availability of small arms, which drove the 
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price of assault rifles as low as $15 in Mogadishu in the early 1990s.
124  Extreme 
deregulation, coupled with technological innovation that increases the reach of local 
politicians-turned-businessmen reinforces the power of these global networks.  Banks 
do business in Mogadishu without benefit of a government, for example, even if they 
spend a third of their operating expenses on armed security.
125  Private businessmen 
have foreign firms print money.  Mogadishu cell and satellite phone companies 
compete for customers and offer some for Africa’s lowest rates for international 
telephone service.
 126  As shown above, telecom services also emerge as part of a 
larger process of commercial adaptation to the legal and practical consequences of the 
absence of globally recognized sovereignty, especially as this affects standard 
commercial banking practices. 
Still, it appears that Somalia’s situation, or at least the southern territory of the 
pre-1991 state, shows the inevitability of increased disorder, impoverishment, and 
exclusion from productive economic transactions of the world at large that 
accompanies state collapse.  Even lacking valuable, easily exploited resources such as 
Congolese or Sierra Leonean diamonds, or Liberian timber, the region’s regulatory 
void attracts predatory operators.  Local entrepreneurs are cited as central actors in the 
regional trade in the mild stimulant qat and have been suspected of making deals with 
toxic waste dumpers, including an $80 million contract in 1992 with Italian and Swiss 
companies to dump waste in Somalia.
127  The International Chamber of Commerce 
warns mariners that Somalia’s coast is a major world center of piracy.
128   
Violent competition to control resources through co-opting informal and illicit 
trans-border networks appears inimical to the formation of new states and even 
threatens to destabilize surviving neighbouring states.  But cases above show that this 
is true only where competitors control links to external markets in ways that give 
them less interest in protecting local people.  If rulers can use trading networks to 
replace cold war diplomatic alliances and state revenue institutions to get resources, 
they have little incentive to engage in expensive and politically risky tasks of 
protecting people or promoting productivity if they have to worry about short-term 
threats from those who prey upon the same people.  They also may worry that 
members of their own entourage will conclude that becoming a freelance predator is 
more rewarding than sticking by the side of a doomed central authority.  Faced with 
this dilemma, some incumbent rulers also turn to predation to survive.  In any event, 
creating a cohesive community on the scale of Somaliland amidst rival violent groups 
should be an unlikely prospect, given the formidable obstacles to collective action. 
Achille Mbembe observes that state collapse also feeds off global economic 
ideologies that prescribe shrinking corrupt bureaucracies and lessening state economic 
regulation.  Market liberalization increases the ease with which incumbent politicians 
and new competitors appropriate resources that states once controlled.  It also 
undermines old strategies of holding together states with patronage networks based 
upon overstaffed state bureaucracies and informal access to state regulated economic 
opportunities in return for political loyalty and popular acceptance.  This failure 
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promotes the further disintegration of central authority and its replacement with 
‘private indirect government’
129 much like a private business syndicate or mafia.  This 
historical shift in Africa ‘is the direct link that now exists between, on the one hand, 
deregulation and the primacy of the market and, on the other, the rise of violence and 
the creation of private military, paramilitary, or juridical organizations’.
130 
Attacks on bureaucracies often spell the end of central authority capable of 
regulating economic transactions and providing protection for the benefit of a 
citizenry.  Indeed, many state officials simply intensify exploitative operations that 
they already controlled by virtue of their positions in corrupt regimes, a development 
familiar from Somalia’s turmoil.  Ellis describes this tendency in his study of 
fragmenting patronage networks leading to Liberia’s 1989-96 civil war: ‘The longer 
the war lasted, the more factions appeared… The object of factional activity was to 
wrest control of territory and economic resources, and individual war bands often 
threatened to split from their patrons or fought each other for turf even within 
factions’,
131 a pattern appearing in Somalia in the late 1980s.  Internal conflict 
intensifies as members of ethnic and clan groups turn to one another to provide 
security.  Once one group arms itself outsiders have a hard time distinguishing 
between predatory, versus strictly defensive moves of neighbors.
132  Schierup 
describes this process in the breakup of Yugoslavia as a ‘retraditionalization’ of 
politics similar to the rising prominence of clans in Somalia’s conflict.  Facing threats 
from other groups, ‘the local party elites and the increasingly “national” working 
classes were to be bound together by innumerable ties of an increasingly 
traditionalistic character.  They were displayed in idioms such as kinship, friendship, 
locality, and ethnicity, taking the form of a complex network of reciprocal favours’.
133   
Those facing predation from the violent competition of rulers and rival 
strongmen to control commercial networks often seek protection in clans and ethnic 
associations.  Resurgent ‘traditional’ identity is a response to local political economies 
shaped by marginality to new global conditions and shifts toward more violent forms 
of accumulation.  Communities mobilize kinship and ethnic networks to protect 
themselves from predations of those who fight to control resources and social 
networks, and to make their own connections to global networks to get resources they 
need for their survival.
134 This ‘rationality of fear’ undermines any effort to rebuild 
centralized authority, since all other groups will gang up on one that appears able to 
dominate the rest.  This increases incentives to find one’s own protectors, usually 
political opportunists who field paramilitaries to support local clandestine business 
operations.  This arrangement offers limited relief to local communities, while also 
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boosting the wealth and power of these enterprising individuals who use violence to 
exploit economic opportunities.
135  
Yet current conditions in at least the northern parts of the Somali space are 
very different from these general analyses of state collapse.  The prospects for self-
determination in Somaliland and Puntland show that the future is more uncertain, 
which also means that their futures look somewhat less bleak than in similar cases of 
state collapse and protracted conflict.  Above all, these cases point to the dangers of 
comparing political choices in the midst of state collapse to market choices.  While it 
seems that one can expect that actors will chose actions that result in further 
aggression and fragmentation, this is not always the case.  The end of wars in 
Somaliland, the Ingush Republic and many other would-be conflict zones that do not 
get much media coverage—because they are relatively peaceful—show that actions 
operate in a social context of markets, whether clandestine or otherwise.  Thus 
political actors in Somaliland prove somewhat able to make up their own ‘rules of the 
game’ after state collapse.  They cannot make those rules as they please.  The prior 
distribution of shares of resources, the locations of these actors, and the interests of 
outsiders all shape what is possible and what can reasonably be accomplished with 
regard to building new political orders.  Yet within these broad structural parameters 
purposeful action can create ‘post state collapse’ instances of self-determination. 
From a broader historical perspective this constrained capacity to make solve 
political problems of state collapse is not surprising.  After all, the post 1960 Somali 
state was itself a ‘solution’ to the colonial division of Somali people, much as pre-
colonial sultanates arose out of disorder of their times.  Quite simply, state collapse is 
not a permanent condition; otherwise, where would states have come from in the first 
place? 
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